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 FOREWORD
Professor Brent Fisse,
Director, Institute of Criminology
Few topics in the criminal law have excited as much controversy as telephone
tapping and electronic surveillance. For some, the use of taps and bugs is, as
Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, “dirty business” in which governments should
not engage. For others, the sophistication of modern criminals impels the use
of whatever technological aids can be marshalled in response. Notwithstanding
the controversy, extensive powers have been enacted in Australia at both state
and federal level. The nature and implications of these powers are not widely
understood, which explains the occasion for holding the public seminar reported
in these Proceedings.
The opening paper, by Graham Blewitt of the National Crime Authority,
presents a case for the use of electronic surveillance by enforcement agencies.
The paper sets out the legislative aftermath of the Age tapes affair, especially
the 1987 amendments to the Telecommunications (Interception) Act (Cth.). It
also indicates the way in which the use of electronic surveillance has been useful
in practice, as in Operation Silo, a successful investigation into the infamous
drug traﬂicking activities of Mr Comwell and Mr Bull. Mr Blewitt contends that
the debate about electronic surveillance15 no longer a debate about whether or
not law enforcement agencies should have powers to tap or bug, but rather what
safeguards are needed to minimise invasion of personal privacy. The opinion
is expressed that the safeguards provided in the Telecommunications
(Interception) Act (Cth.) amended in 1987 are sufﬁcient to meet the basic
concern that electronic surveillance by its very nature tends to be exploratory,
unselective and indiscriminate.
Phillip Bradley, of the Commonwealth D.P.P.’s oﬂice, reviews the
legislative powers of electronic surveillance that now exist in Australia. An
important theme of the paper is the lack of uniformity in approach under
Commonwealth legislation. Thus, the Customs Act provisions dealing with
electronic surveillance lack the safeguards provided under the 1987 amendments
to the Telecommunications (Interception) Act; this seems a pernicious feat of
legislative bifurcation. Another major theme of the paper is the risk of invasion
of privacy from other forms of surveillance that are now inadequately
controlled; visual surveillance by means of infra-red technology is a case in
point. Attention is also drawn to the limits of the statutory rules governing
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence; those rules do not strip away “the
fruit of the poisonous tree” (i.e. evidence obtained by acting on information
unlawfully acquired).
The third paper, by Beverley Schurr, a well-known commentator on
issues of civil liberties, surveys the extent to which telephone tapping and
electronic eavesdropping are used in Australia and critically assesses the
adequacy of the safeguards against abuse of power. It is estimated that over
8 000 Australians are subject to telephone intercepts each year, that over
100 000 conversations are recorded annually, and that the average cost per
warrant is $75,000. In contrast to the position taken by Mr Blewitt, Ms Schurr
argues that existing safeguards against abuse are insufﬁcient. Particular criticism
is levelled at the judicial administration of surveillance warrants, at the
procedures for monitoring and publicly reporting the use made of the extensive
powers provided, and at the remedies available to citizens in the event of abuse.
Comparisons are drawn with the legislative controls in place in Canada and the
U.S.A.; the Australian legislative models emerge unfavourably.
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The ﬁnal paper presented at the seminar is by Tim Game and Jim
Nolan, two barristers closely familiar with the work of the Joint Select
Committee on Telecommunication Interception in 1986. The Report of the
Joint Select Committee made a number of major recommendations most of
which _were adopted in the 1987 amendments to the Telecommuncation
(Interception) Act. Mr Game and Mr Nolan are critical of a number of features
of the legislation, including the classiﬁcation of offences subject to surveillance
warrants, and the criteria governing the issue of warrants for Class 1 offences
under the Act. They also stress the need for more adequate civil remedies, and
commend the approach adopted in West Germany, namely that targets are
notiﬁed if they have been under surveillance, and civil damages are payable in
the event of unlawful exercise of power.
The wide-ranging debate that followed will amply repay the time of the
reader; The clashes in opinion are instructive and there is a good deal of fresh
information, notably in relation to the issue of surveillance warrants and the
manner in which they are executed. Alas, time did not allow all pockets of the
subject to be washed in skeptical acid. Thus, if weeks and months of
conversations are collected, how is it possible to give defendants and jurors the
access they may need to the unedited material? On this issue, among many
others, the debate has not ended; it has just begun.
ll
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: THE NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY ,
PERSPECTIVE
Graham Blewitt,
Senior Adviser (Legal), National Crime Authority
In popular perception, Australians have always been wary of authority and
Government power and in recent years debate on the erosion of civil liberties
and the encroachment of ofﬁcial power has intensiﬁed. It is no coincidence that
this has occurred during a period when the public has also become aware of
the phenomenon of organised crime and its effect on society. Since the late
1970’s several Royal Commissions have identiﬁed a growing sophistication in
the associations and methods used by criminals particularly in the area of drug
trafﬁcking where rewards for criminal activity are so high. The dramatic increase
in the availability of narcotic substances in Australia, together with a perception
that signiﬁcant growth in crimes against property and street violence is
associated with drug trafﬁcking, has generated considerable community and
Government reaction and resulted in a number of legislative initiatives aimed
at providing extra support to law enforcement agencies in their efforts at
combating organised and other drug related crime. Two examples at the
Commonv'Vealth, level are the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979, and
insertion of provisions in the Customs Act 1901, to enable law enforcement
ofﬁcials to use listening devices in the investigation of narcotics offences. State
Parliaments have also enacted legislation to enable their police forces to use
listening devices and are currently contemplating legislation to enable their
police to use telephone interception. Electronic surveillance is not seen by law
enforcement agencies as legitimate tools to be used in investigating serious
criminal activity. .
The National Crime Authority, though a relative newcomer to law
enforcement in Australia, has no doubt that the use of electronic surveillance
can be a most effective tool in the investigation of particular types of crime,
especially crimes which involve a large degree of planning and co-ordination.
‘It may be useful for the purposes of this seminar if I outline very brieﬂy
the role of the Authority, the powers available to it and the checks and balances
governing its operations. The Authority is a unique organisation in Australia,
established as a Commonwealth statutory authority with State and Territory
underpinning legislation, with both Commonwealth and State jurisdiction,
coercive powers, staffed by persons with expertise in the disciplines of law and
accounting as well as police investigators and support staff, and the ability to
concentrate those resources on an essentially limited number of cases.
Parliaments sought to strike a balance between effective criminal
investigation powers and the protection of personal liberties by providing in
the Commonwealth National Crime Authority Act and underpinning State Acts
3 number of checks and balances on its‘ powers and operations. These include
an lnter—Govemmental Committee of Ministers, the Federal Parliamentary Joint
Committee on the National Crime Authority, the requirement to publish an
Annual Report to be tabled in Parliament and Federal Court Review of
Authority decisions. The Authority is restricted to investigating “relevant
criminal activity”, a deﬁnition intended to include criminal activity which might
be described as “organised crime”, a term which does not appear in the
‘ legislation. The Authority is required to investigate for the purpose of providing
admissible evidence for use in prosecution and its work is thus subject to the'
scrutiny of the courts.
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Telephone Tapping
Telecommunications interception, colloquially known as telephone
tapping, includes the interception of any communication over a
telecommunications service and includes telephone, telex, facsimile and
telegrams. For the purposes of this seminar I will focus most of my comments
on telephone interceptions to simplify the discussion and because there is no
distinction in principle between telephone tapping and other forms of
surveillance involving electronic devices.
Telephone interception powers provided by the Telecommunications
(Interception) Act 1979 are presently available only to the Australian Security
Intelligence Organization, in relation to matters of national security, and to the
Australian Federal Police (A.F.P.) in relation to drug traﬂicking investigations.
The A.F.P. has been conducting a limited number of interceptions on the
Authority’s behalf. However, the nature of the Authority’s task—which is to
investigate complex criminal matters where ordinary police methods are not or
would not be effective—required that the power to intercept telephone
communications be extended to the Authority in its own right.
The Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1987, expected
to be proclaimed shortly, will provide access to telecommunications interception
to the A.F.P., the National Crime Authority, and (subject to the enactment of
State legislation) State and Territory police forces in relation to investigation
of a variety of serious offences (Class 1 and 2 offences as deﬁned in s. 5 (l) of
the Act) including murder, kidnapping, narcotics~ offences and offences
punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or longer involving loss of life, serious
personal injury or damage to property, trafficking in narcotic drugs, serious
fraud or loss to the Commonwealth revenue.
The Authority has been provided with additional grounds for seeking a
warrant to intercept telecommunications, in relation to any other offences being
investigated under a reference (or special investigation) issued by a State or
Commonwealth Minister pursuant to s. 13 or 14 of the National Crime
Authority Act 1984 (Commonwealth).
It is my role in this seminar to put the case for the availability to law
enforcement agencies of electronic surveillance. From my standpoint as a senior
lawyer in an organisation established expressly to combat organised crime, I
naturally approach discussions about how best to ﬁght organised crime on a
practical rather than a theoretical level. We are seeking to curtail and disrupt
criminal activities such as murder, drug trafﬁcking and violence which is no
longer isolated and affecting only a small criminal class, but striking at society
at large. There is a growing belief in the community that the public interest in
the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals
outweighs the public interest in free and private communication and “the right
to be left alone”. The Australian public now see drug trafﬁcking and other
organised crime as more dangerous to a free and democratic society than the
threats to individual liberty posed by government approved electronic
surveillance.
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The Authority recognises and indeed shares the concern by some
members of the community that hard-won civil and personal liberties are put
at risk when law enforcement agencies clamour for additional powers to assist
them in carrying out complex criminal investigations, particularly in relation
to organised crime. There are well-grounded fears that greater powers will be
used to repress individuals or minorities and become ends in themselves rather
than means to an end. The Authority is fully aware that the interception of
telecommunications is a serious invasion of individual privacy and as such
should be subject to strict controls. The debate about electronic surveillance is
however, no longer a debate about whether or not law enforcement agencies
should have access to such powers, but rather what safeguards are needed to
minimise the inevitable invasion into personal privacy which results.
In some ways we are dealing with a new type of criminal in our attempts
to c0mbat organised crime. Crime, like other facets of life in the late twentieth
century, is becoming increasingly sophisticated in its methods and operation
and more intrusive than ever before. The equipment and methods which enable
greater productivity in business are also applied to criminal enterprises. The
most visible and widely reported aspect of crime in the 1980’s is drug
trafﬁcking—a term which has become synonymous with organised crime. The
enormous proﬁts from drug trafﬁcking are themselves the cause and instrument
of corruption of public and private ofﬁcials; the proceeds of criminal enterprises
are, after laundering, being invested in legitimate businesses and in advanced
technology which is used to thwart law enforcement efforts. There are examples
around the world where drug-related organised crime has inﬁltrated a society
to such an extent that it threatens to become an alternative government; it has
been widely reported that in some areas in Central and South America it has
become the effective government.
The Age Tapes
The issue of law enforcement access to telecommunications interception
was brought somewhat dramatically to public and government attention by the
so called “Age Tapes” saga. As you will recall, the Chairman of the Authority,
Mr Justice D. G. Stewart as Royal Commissioner inquiring into drug trafﬁcking,
was called upon to investigate allegations that police in New South Wales had
over along period conducted illegal telephone interceptions. In the course of his
inquiries, Mr Justice Stewart received submissions from, amongst others, police,
the bar, the Law Society of New South Wales and the Privacy Committee.
Police submissions to the Royal Commission requested the extension of
intercept powers to State and Territory police forces and the enlargement of
the kinds of suspected offences for which telecommunications interception could
be obtained; one argument put forward was that “honest police” would no
longer have to break the law in order to catch criminals. The Royal Commission
was confronted with the circumstance that police ofﬁcers had turned to illegal
methods of obtaining evidence when they felt the odds were stacked in favour
of the criminal. Although this is an unsavoury argument in favour of extending
telecommunications interception powers or indeed any other power, it is one
that cannot be ignored; it is perhaps,analogous to the situation which arises
when police are required to enforce bad laws. Mr Justice Stewart stated in his
report that there can be no justiﬁcation for police taking the law into their own
hands and very few people would disagree with his point of view. Without
debating the point further, it should be noted that organised crime members
have the technological equipment and expertise to intercept telecommunications
themselves. We should not delude ourselves into believing that they feel bound
by s. 7 of the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act.
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In his Royal Commission report, Mr Justice Stewart remarked that his
COmmission had been given an insight into telephone tapping that is denied to
most persons in the community, including legislators and public servants. Mr
Justice Stewart went on to discuss the beneﬁts gained by the inquiry’s
examination of illegal intercepts—that the material obtained by the Commission
was of considerable value in identifying possible criminal offences, that the
material had considerable value as criminal intelligence, notwithstanding that
some of it was rather old, that the material had led the Commission to the ﬁrm
opinion that limiting the interception of telephone conversations by police to
drug traﬂicking was far too selective, arbitrary and artiﬁcial and there was no
reason why the power to intercept telephone conversations should be restricted
to the A.F.P. and ﬁnally that the administrative system for lawful telephone
tapping should have the capacity to establish quickly a telephone interception
in certain circumstances. In his ﬁnal report Mr Justice Stewart recommended
that telephone interception powers be extended to State and Territory police
forces and to the National Crime Authority. He also recommended the removal
Of the drug trafficking offence limitation in the 1979 Act.
What Mr Justice Stewart has advocated, both as Royal Commissioner
and as Chairman of the Authority, is that law enforcement agencies must have
prompt access to information which will assist in countering drug related and
other organised crime and in solving other serious criminal offences. As noted
earlier, we should not fall into the trap of believing that only drug traﬂicking
justiﬁes telephone interceptions. Drug trafﬁcking in itself is not necessarily the
most serious crime in the criminal calendar and drug trafﬁckers are of course
involved in other serious criminal offences.
Safeguards
The Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1987 is a
signiﬁcant move towards providing law enforcement agencies with the necessary
tools to combat such crime. Interception of communications is illegal except in
deﬁned circumstances. Stringent safeguards have been written into the
legislation to ensure that the facility is used only when necessary, and within
speciﬁed parameters. Safeguards on the use of interception powers include a
requirement for judicial warrants, provisions for the auditing by an independent
authority (the Ombudsman) of interception activities and of compliance with
the requirements of the Act, and provisions regulating the use, disclosure and
destruction of the produce of intercepts. In addition, information obtained in
contravention of the Act is inadmissible in evidence in any court, exCept for-
the purpose of establishing the contravention.
Taking the case of the Authority as an example, a Member of the
Authority or a nominated member of a police force who is a member of the
staff of the Authority may apply in writing (or in urgent circumstances by
telephone) to an eligible judge for a warrant authorising a telecommunications
service to be intercepted. The application for a warrant is to be accompanied
by an affidavit. The information required to be provided to the judge includes—
1. the description and location of the service to be intercepted;
2. the full name and, if known, the address and occupation of
the person using, or likely to use, the service;
  
3. the period for which it is considered the warrant be in force
(and reasons why it is considered necessary to be in force for
that period;
4. in relation to the service, and in relation to each person to
whom the application relates, the following information, so far
as it can be derived from the Authority’s records:
(a) the number of previous applications (if any) for. warrants
related to the service or that person, as the case may be;
(b) the number of warrants (if any) previously issued on such
applications; and
(c) particulars of the use made by the Authority of
information obtained by interceptions under such
Warrants;
[points 3 and 4 are covered by s. 42]
5. in relation to a telephone application:
(a) particulars of the urgent circumstances making
application by telephone necessary; and
(b) each matter that, if the application had been made in
writing, 5. 41, 42 or 48 would have required (5. 43);
6. in relation to class I oﬂences:
(a) the nature of the offence;
(b) why it is suspected that a particular person is using, or is
likely to use, the service;
(0) whether information likely to be obtained by the
interception would be likely to assist in the Authority’s
investigation of the offence;
(d) why some or all of the information in (d) cannot
appropriately be obtained by other (non-interception)
methods, having regard to the extent to which those
methods have been used by, or are available to the
Authority; how much of the information would be likely
to be obtained by such methods; and how much the use
of such methods would be .likely to prejudice the
investigation (because of delay or other reason) (5 45);
7. in relation to class 2 oﬂences:
(a) the nature of the offence;
(b) why it is suspected that a particular person is using, or is
likely to use, the service;
(0) whether' information likely to be obtained by the
interception would be likely to assist in the Authority’s
investigation of the offence;
(d) how much the privacy of any person(s) would be likely
to be interfered with by the proposed interception;
(e) details as to the gravity of the conduct constituting the
offence(s) being investigated;
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(0 how much the information in 6 (c) would be likely to
assist in the investigation of the offence;
(g) to what extent other (non-interception) methods have
already been used by, or are available to, the Authority;
(h) how much the use of such methOds would be likely to
assist in the inveStigation; and
(i) how much the use of such methods would be likely to
prejudice the investigation (5. 46); and
8. in relation to entry onto premises, the matters set out in s. 48.
In issuing the warrant the judge may specify conditions or restrictions
applying to interceptions under it, and will specify the period for which it is in
force, to a maximum of 90 days.
Central to the scheme of the legislation is the establishment of the
Telephone Interception Division (T.I.D.) of the A.F.P. whose function it is to
execute all interception warrants for the A.F.P., N.C.A. and State Police Forces
or the N.S.W. State Drug Crime Commission. The T.I.D. was established
following the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee on
Telecommunications Interception. The Committee considered that a centralised
system would be an important additional safeguard. The Committee also
recommended, and the Government accepted, that except in rare circumstances,
all interceptions should be made through Telecom.
The Act provides that the Ombudsman has responsibility for conducting
independent inspections of the records of the Authority at least twice each
ﬁnancial year. Inspections may also be carried out at any time, at which the
Ombudsman has full and free access to records; may make copies and take
extracts from those records; and can require ofﬁcers to give information that
the Ombudsman considers necessary. In order to satisfy these requirements the
Authority has instituted stringent internal reporting procedures.
The Authority is also required to provide reports and information to
the Minister. This material is to be used by the Minister for his annual reports
which are to be laid before each House of Parliament. The reporting
requirements also allow the Minister to exercise continuous oversight on the
operations of the scheme for conducting telecommunication interceptions. The
Act requires the Chairman to provide the Minister with:
O a copy of each warrant issued to the Authority and a copy of each
instrument revoking any such warrant, as soon as is practicable (ss.
94 (1));
0 within 3 months after a warrant issued to the Authority ceases to
be in force, a report on the use made by the Authority of
information obtained under the warrant and the communication of
such information to persons other than ofﬁcers of the Authority (55.
94 (2)); and
0 as soon as practicable, and in any event within 2 months, after each
30th June, a report setting out such information as is required to
be set out in the Minister’s report, which can be derived from the
Authority’s records (ss. 94 (3)).
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Intercept information has been described as “earwitness” evidence as
distinct from, and as valuable as “eyewitness” evidence. A concern raised by
the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report on Criminal Investigations in
1975 was that electronic surveillance must be distinguished from ordinary
search and seizure for physical objects because by its very nature electronic
surveillance tends to be exploratory, unselective and indiscriminate. This
objection has been met by the comprehensive set of safeguards provided1n the
1987 Amendment Act.
The Authority is not inexperienced in the use of telecommunications '
interception as an investigative tool. Since June 1985, 49 intercepts have been
initiated by the Authority and conducted on its behalf by the A.F.P. Similarly
the Authority has had recourse to listening devices for which warrants have been
granted under both State and Commonwealth law.
Surveillance and Operation Silo
Agencies such as the Authority use electronic surveillance to detect crime
and the planning of criminal activity in order to catch the principals, not just
the minions who take the risks and in most cases the falls. As the former
Director of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FB. I.,) Judge
William H. Webster stated during a visit to Australia in 1986, the use by the
F.BI of electronic surveillance has permitted it to penetrate the upper echelons
of organised crime, and without it the F.B.I would have made little progress in
combating corruption and organised crime. The same can be said of Australian
law enforcement agencies. A survey of recent criminal cases would almost
certainly indicate that electronic surveillance is playing an increasingly large role
in the detection and investigation of serious crime. In many cases it is the only
way to gather admissible evidence against principals who are careful to distance
themselves from “blue collar” criminal activity. Electronic surveillance also
provides intelligence which can be followed up by other investigative effort. Law
enforcement agencies should not of course sit around waiting for suspects to
incriminate themselves in conversation; electronic surveillance is not a
substitute for the hard slog of investigation.
It has been argued, quite justiﬁably, that the use of listening devices is
even more intrusive than telephone tapping which is conﬁned to conversations
conducted over telephone services. Listening devices on the other hand pick up
conversations and any other sounds within their radius regardless of source or
content. The most intimate and personal conversations can be picked up by
listening devices. It is somewhat ironic that heated debate on the threat to
privacy almost invariably focuses on telephone interceptions. There are of
course legislative safeguards relating to the authorised use of listening devices.
In New South Wales for example warrants valid for up to 21 days are issued
by a Supreme Court judge if he or she15 satisfied that the request is justiﬁed.
Amendments to the Customs Act 1901 to enable the National Crime Authority
to use listening devices for the purposes of narcotics inquiries on the same lines
as the A.F.P. were recently introduced into Federal Parliament. The powers are
exercisable only under a warrant and provision is made for destruction of
records, the retention of all warrants issued to an agency, and the furnishing to
the Minister, in this case the Attomey-General, of copies of warrants and reports
outlining the use made of the information obtained by using a listening device.
The Authority would have preferred that such powers be available for non-
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narcotic inquiries; the list of offences for which telephone intercept warrants
are to be made available after proclamation of the Telecommunications
(Interception) Amendment Act 1987 would be appropriate. As a matter of
principle, the use of listening devices in the investigation of other serious crime
is equally justiﬁed.
Because relevant prosecution proceedings are now complete, the
Authority is in a position to discuss the operational details of one of its
completed investigations, Operation Silo, with particular reference to the use
of electronic surveillance in that investigation. The report into Operation Silo—
the investigation of Comwell and Bull—has been tabled in the Commonwealth
Parliament. Comwell and Bull had been identiﬁed as major ﬁgures in the illegal
narcotics trade as early as 1974 in the case of Bull, and in the Woodward Royal
Commission Report 1979 in the case of Comwell. Comwell was one of the
original targets of the Commonwealth/N.S.W. Joint Task Force on Drug
Traﬂicking and both men had been mentioned as large scale drug trafﬁckers in
the Costigan Royal Commission Report in 1984.
Soon after the Authority was established in July 1984 a general
investigation was commenced into Cornwell and Bull. References were issued
by the Commonwealth and New South Wales Ministers in December, 1984 and '
May, 1984 respectively, thus allowing the Authority to use its special powers
in the course of this investigation.
The information which the Authority inherited from the previous
investigations suggested that Cornwell was the head of a drug syndicate which
had operated between South East Asia and the east coast of Australia since at
least 1977. Related activities included corruption, taxation and foreign exchange
offences, and murder. He was alleged to have used the services of Customs and
airline ofﬁcials and to have established a number of companies and trusts to
launder the proceeds of drug trafficking and to facilitate the movement of funds
offshore. Furthermore, he remained a principal suspect in the murders of
Terrance Basham and Susan Smith in northern New South Wales in 1982.
At the time the Commonwealth reference was received by the Authority,
the whereabouts of ComWell and Bull were unknown. The Commonwealth/New
South Wales Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking had been trying to locate
them for some time. There had been a great deal of publicity about the two,
both at the time the Costigan Report was published and on prior occasions;
particularly in newspaper articles concerning drug trafficking in the Noosa area.
Despite numerous allegations, supporting information was minimal and there
was no speciﬁc offence on which the Authority could act.
It was the Authority’s aim to investigate Cornwell and Bull for current
relevant criminal activity and to identify their assets. The Authority also
proposed to examine past criminal activity where this was appropriate.
Cornwell was located by the Authority in Sydney in mid-July, 1985. By
early August it was known where he was living, the false names he was using
and with whom he was associating. Furthermore, a safe house used by Comwell
and Bull had been located in Edgecliff and by the end of August a listening
device had been installed in those premises. A telephone intercept was also
placed on the telephone at these premises in the following month.  
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The conversations monitored at the Edgecliff premises indicated that
Cornwell was still active in the drug trade and was planning an importation of
cannabis by boat from Thailand, possibly in December, 1985 or January, 1986.
Reference was also made in these conversations to a previous importation which
had arrived in Coffs Harbour earlier in 1985.
Cornwell and Bull ceased using the safe house in Edgecliffin September,
1985 and again disappeared A listening device was installed, pursuant to
warrant, in premises known to be used by Bull and his de facto wife, Sylvia
Lux, with a view to locating Cornwell and Bull. Observations of these premises
and intelligence obtained through the listening device ultimately led to the
identiﬁcation of a person, code-named Alpha, who had knowledge of Comwell’s
involvement in the importation of cannabis during the previous year.
On 4th November, 1985, Cornwell’s wife left Australia via Brisbane
bound for London. Arrangements were made through Interpol for her to be
followed in London. As anticipated, she led police to Cornwell and he was
arrested in London on 7th November, 1985. Cornwell was ﬁnally extradited ,,
from the United Kingdom in August, 1986 -
The second major target, Barry Richard Bull, was arrested at the
German/Austrian border on 22nd April, 1986. He escaped from custody on 18th
June. The Authority was able to supply certain information to the Austrian
authorities which resulted in Bull’s recapture on 29th July, 1986. Bull was
extradited from Austria in September, 1986.
On 16th September 1987 Cornwell was sentenced to 23 years’
imprisonment on two cases of conspiracy to import cannabis and Bull to 18
years’ imprisonment on one case of Conspiracy to import cannabis Looking
back on the conduct of the investigation, if it had not been for the use of
electronic surveillance, the Authbrity may never have known about the
importation through Coﬁ‘s Harbour in 1985, let alone convict them of the
offence. The use of electronic surveillance provided direct evidence of offences,
provided valuable intelligence which was followed up, helped to relocate the
two principals and played a major part in the identiﬁcation of a witness without
whose evidence Cornwell may not have been brought to trial in Australia.
Operation Silo is one of the Authority’s most successful operations to
date. Without the use of electronic surveillance it may have failed, been only
partly successful, or taken considerably longer to bring to prosecution stage.
There are inevitably resource limitations placed on law enforcement agencies;
like other organisations they must make best use of limited funds and staff.
Electronic surveillance and other sophisticated techniques help to achieve more
cost effective law enforcement within those limitations.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Graham Blewilt
The main thrust of my paper is that the debate about electronic
surveillance is no longer. a debate about whether or not law enforcement
agencies should have access to such powers but rather what safeguards are
needed to minimise the inevitable invasion into personal privacy which results.
There are a number of reasons in support of this view. Firstly, the
detection of organised crime is becoming more difficult by reason of the growing
sophistication of methods used by criminals. Secondly, there is a public
perception, which is in my opinion a reality, that organised crime, in particular
its manifestation in drug trafficking and the enormous proﬁts to be made,
together with the multiplicity of criminal activity and corruption that is
generated by it, is having an adverse effect on our society. Thirdly, for law
enforcement to be effective there is little point in concentrating the effort and
investigations of law envorcements agencies into the activities of the visible
“minor” criminals who “take the falls”, as it were. Rather, for there to be an
effective attack on organised crime there needs to be an attack on the principals
behind it—those who provide the organisation and the ﬁnance.
To this end electronic surveillance is one of the tools needed by law
enforcement agencies, including the Authority, to penetrate the upper echelons
of organised crime and to gather admissible evidence to bring them to justice.
It is my view that provided there are adequate safeguards to ensure that the
civil rights of law abiding citizens are not abused by law enforcement agencies,
then it is legitimate for governments to give to law enforcement agencies the
tools they need to investigate serious criminal activity.
_ It would be my submission that there are in fact adequate safeguards to
minimise the invasion of personal privacy which results in the use of electronic
surveillance. In my paper I have mentioned some of the safeguards provided
by the legislation which will enable the Authority, the State Drug Crime
Commission, State police forces, as well as A810 and the A.F.P. to tap
telephones. This legislation of course is the Telecommunications (Interception)
Amendment Act which is expected to be proclaimed in the near future. From
the Authority’s point of view, that Act will enable the Authority to seek a
warrant to intercept telecommunications in relation to any offence being
investigated by the Authority under a special reference.
Perhaps it might be convenient for me to pause here and explain some
of the functions of the National Crime Authority. The Authority is empowered
to conduct general investigations as derived from s. 11 (i) (b) of the National
Crime Authority Act. The Authority, in relation to a general investigation, has
the power to conduct of its own volition an investigation into criminal activity,
the only limitation being that the investigation must relate to “relevant criminal
activity”. That is a term which is deﬁned in the National Crime Authority Act.
and means “any circumstance implying or any allegation that a relevant offence
may have been, or may be being committed against the laws of the
Commonwealth, or the States, or a Territory”. The term “relevant offence” is
also deﬁned in the Act and means “an offence which involves two or more
offenders, which involves substantial planning and organisation, which also
involves, or is a kind that ordinarily involves, the use of sophisticated methods
and techniques”, and ﬁnally “involves theft, fraud, tax evasion, currency
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violations, illegal drug trafficking, extortion, violence, and the like”. A special
investigation on the other hand is one carried out pursuant to a reference from
either the Commonwealth Government under s. 13 of the Act, or from the State
g0vernments under s. 14. References are granted in circumstances where the
Authority is required to investigate complex criminal matters, where ordinary
police methods are not, or would not be, effective. The granting of a reference
to the Authority, enables the Authority to use its coercive powers to investigate
an alleged criminal activity. These powers include the powers to summons and
examine witnesses, the power to compel the production of documents and
things, the power to obtain search warrants, and the power to require the
delivery up of passports to the Authority.
I have outlined in my paper (pages 14—16) the various checks and
balances on the Authority’s powers and operations, which includes the activities
of the Inter-Governmental Committee, the Joint Parliamentary Committee, the
requirements of the Authority to publish an Annual Report, and the general
powers in the Federal Court to review the decisions of the Authority. Some of
the stringent safeguards written into the Telecommunications (Interception)
Amendment Act which will attempt to ensure that the interception facility. is
used only when necessary, are set out in my paper, but include the requirements
for judicial warrants, the auditing by an independent authority, that is the
Ombudsman, and provisions which regulate the use, disclosure and destruction
of the product of the intercepts. These safeguards are dealt with in some detail
in my paper and in the other papers being presented at this seminar. There is
no need to repeat them here.
I would like to now turn to some of the safeguards that exist in relation
to warrants issued pursuant to the New South Wales Listening Devices Act.
These are only touched upon brieﬂy in my paper and it seems appropriate .to
mention them at this point. Section 16 of the Listening Devices Act provides
that a Supreme Court judge must be satisﬁed before he issues a warrant that
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an indictable offence has been,
or is about to be, or is likely to be, committed. The judge must further be
satisﬁed that the use of a listening device is necessary to obtain evidence of the
commission of the offence or to investigate it.
Further the court must have regard to the nature of the offence, the
extent to which privacy is likely to be affected, what alternative methods of
obtaining evidence or information are available, what evidentiary value will the
evidence provide, and the details of any previous warrants issued in relation to
the investigation of the offence. One of the main safeguards, however, is that
the warrant can only be enforced for a period not exceeding 21 days.
The judge can also impose conditions in the warrant relating to the
premises in which the device will be installed and the use that the device will
be used for. Section 17 of the Listening Devices Act provides that a notice of
intention of seeking a listening device warrant must be served on the Attorney
General thus giving him the opportunity of appearing and opposing the issue
of the warrant. That notice provides some specific matters relating to the issue
of the warrant, namely the premises where the device will be installed and the
persons whose conversations will be listened to.   
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Section 19 of the Act provides that upon the expiration of the warrant
that a report must be furnished to both the court and to the Attorney General.
The practice is usually that that report needs to be submitted within about 14
days of the expiration of the warrant. The report sets out the names of the
persons whose conversations have been listened to, the period that the listening
device was used, particulars of the premises in which the listening device was
installed, and a description of the use made, or to be made, of the evidence or
information obtained. The court can order such evidence or information to be
brought into court.
Section 20 of the Listening Devices Act enables the court to require if
satisﬁed that the use of the listening device was not justiﬁed and was an
unnecessary interference with privacy, that the details of the warrant and the
listening device be supplied to the person who was subject to the surveillance.
And ﬁnally the remaining safeguard is in s. 22 which requires or provides
for the destruction of irrelevant records obtained by the use of the listening
device. I would like to close by repeating a statement in my paper, namely that:
. . . there is a growing belief in the community that the public
interest in the prevention and detection of crime, in the apprehension
of criminals outweighs the public interest in free and private
communication and the right to be left alone. The Australian public
now see drug traﬁicking and organised crime as more dangerous to a
free and democratic society than the threats to individual liberty posed
by government approved electronic surveillance (page 12).
Bearing in mind the safeguards which regulate the use of by law
enforcement agencies of the various types of electronic surveillance I would
submit that the invasion of personal privacy which results in such use is
minimal and is not a threat to our hard won civil and personal liberties and is
necessary to overcome the greater evil of damage being caused to our society
by organised crime. '
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RECENT EXTENSIONS OF POWER
Phillip Bradley,
Ofﬁce of Director of Public Prosecutions,
Commonwealth of Australia
In this paper I will deal with the main legislation covering electronic
surveillance in this State.
The subject of this paper is recent extensions of power in the area of
electronic surveillance. The area in which power has been extended is in the
area of telephone tapping under the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979
(the Interception Act).
To demonstrate this extension I propose to compare that Act as
amended in 1987 with the previous legislation prior to the amendment. Also I'
propose to compareit with the other important legislation in the area. They
are the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), the Australian Security Intelligence Organization
Act 1979 (Cth) (the A510 Act) and the Listening Devices Act 1984 (N.S.W.).
These Acts deal with the use of “listening devices”. The latter Act is probably
more correctly described as a recent contraction of power; when it was
introduced in 1984 it made it unlawful to record what are known as “partly
consensual conversations” (conversations where one party is “wired for sound”)
without a warrant.
The Scope of the Conduct Proscribed
Mr Justice Douglas of the Supreme Court of the USA. described
electronic surveillance as “the greatest leveller of human privacy ever known”.
This assessment was recently approved by Mr Justice Finlay (Sup. Ct 60488
Transmedia and ors: unpublished). '
It is important in the context of any discussion in this area to keep in
mind that the enactments referred to are designed to proscribe “bugging” except)
in speciﬁed circumstances. It is also important to note that the legislation in
this ﬁeld is not uniform within Australia. While in N.S.W. the combined effect
of the Interceptions Act and the Listening Devices Act is to prohibit electronic
bugging of private conversations without consent or authority this is not the
case in all jurisdictions in Australia. In some jurisdictions, the absence of
listening devices legislation has meant that private conversations can be lawfully
recorded without consent or other authority. Also where there is no listening
devices legislation, the Interceptions Act can be side-stepped by recording a
communication after it has passed over the telecommunications system. (R v
Oliver CCA 141284). Holding a microphone near a telephone handset is a
method by which this can be achieved.
There are other forms of electronic surveillance which are not proscribed
at all. The reason for the selective prohibition of particular electronic
surveillance has probably something to do with the fact'that it is far more
intrusive than other more traditional forms of surveillance and it can be carried
out with relative ease remote from the parties to the transactions the subject of
the surveillance.
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In some areas the advance of technology has made the usual precautions
for the protection of privacy obsolete. Visual surveillance and the use of cameras
is not prohibited at all. This is no doubt due to the fact that those things which
one wants to remain private are not carried out in places where they can be
easily observed or photographed. However, there is now technology which will
permit photographs to be taken from great distances, even from satellites, infra-
red technology allows photographs to be taken in the dark and ﬁbre optics
allows lenses to be placed in locations where no one would have expected a
camera to be. When combined with sound recording visual surveillance can add
a new dimension to the intrusion on privacy.
For each form of communication, whether it be through the air or
hardwires there is a means of interception. Encryption offers some protection,
but it is expensive, cumbersome and not completely effective. The laws of
trespass offer some protection but the remedy usually depends on some physical
interference.
Some commentators have suggested that an action in nuisance would
lie:
Eavesdroppers or such as listen under walls or windows, or the
caves of a house, to hearken after discourse and thereupon to frame
slanderous and mischievous tales are common nuisance and
presentable at the court-leet: or are indictable at the sessions and
punishable by fine and ﬁnding securities for good behaviour
(Blackstones Commentaries (1771) iv, 168-169).
These ancient principles have little relevance to the modern conduct.
In any discussion of the scope of the conduct it is necessary to look
beyond the private communications of individuals. Consider the
communications which large institutions and businesses have on a daily basis.
Various computer systems including electronic mailing systems, accounting
machines and fax machines talk to each other hourly over the telephone lines
and microwave links. These communications can be intercepted with a two
dollar device placed in the Telecom distribution panel which is accessible to
the public in most ofﬁce buildings. An FM receiver, a modem and a printer
will do the rest. Of course that behaviour is a breach of the Interception Act.
Scanners have also been widely used in recent times. These are devices
which intercept the radio transmissions used by cellular telephones. Some
prominent users have been made aware of the limitations of these devices as a
means of keeping conversations private.
The Telecommunications Interception Act
The present Act evolved from the Telephonic Communications
Interception Act 1960. It came into operation on 25th October, 1979, the same
date on which the A510 Act came into force. In addition to the power previously
granted to ASIO, it authorised telephone interception by customs ofﬁcers who
then had responsibility for narcotics investigations. This responsibility was later
taken over by the Australian Federal Police (181/1979). The present Act has
been substantially amended by the 1987 Amendment Act (89/1987).
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The Amendment Act was introduced following the report of the Joint
Select Committee of Telecommunications Interception which was presented in
November, 1986. The Committee had been formed to report upon the
Telecommunications Interception (Amendment) Bill (1986) and the report of
the Age Tapes Royal Commission. The 1986 Bill was a response to the Special
Premiers’ Conference in 1985 wherein the Commonwealth agreed to extend
interception powers to state agencies, but only in respect of drug trafﬁcking. The
Committee identiﬁed a number of issues which basically arose from the
competing interests of the community in achieving efficient and effective law
enforcement and the protection of the individual from unwarranted intrusion.
The Committee recommended that the 1986 Bill be withdrawn and substituted
by another bill which would consolidate and restructure the 1979 Act, extend
powers to agencies other than police, extend the range of offences which could
be the subject of an interception warrant and improve safeguards. The
Committee also recommended that the National Crime Authority, the N.S.W.
Drug Crime Commission and the State and Northern Territory Police Forces
have access to intercepted information. The Committee did not agree that these
other agencies should be able to carry out interceptions themselves as
recommended by the Royal Commission. It recommended that the actual
interception for the purpose of investigation by each of the agencies be carried
out by a single agency within the Australian Federal Police. The Committee
also recommended that the power to intercept be extended beyond investigation
of narcotics offen‘Ces to include other serious offences.
It is expected that the amending Act will take effect in April, 1988.
References below are to the Act as amended.
Interception is deﬁned by s. 6 as listening to or recording by any means
a communication in its passage over a telecommunications system without the
knowledge of the person making the communication. I mentioned earlier that
in some cases it is machines which are communicating though they presumably
do so under the control of persons. Section 7 of the Act prohibits the
interception of a communication passing over a telecommunications system.
(Section 8 deals with the prohibition on the interception of telegrams).
Exceptions are provided where telecom ofﬁcers are working on the system or
identifying or tracing a person who has contravened the Telecommunications
Act, where interception is pursuant to a warrant, and tracing in emergency
situations involving threat to life or serious injury (5. 30).
This power to intercept for tracing purposes in cases of emergencies was
ﬁrst introduced in 1985. Prior to that time interception. was only available in
cases involving narcotics and national security. It wasnOt available1n cases of
bomb threats, kidnapping extortion and the like, though it had been used in
such cases. In some of those cases the evidence was tendered in court and
admitted. In other cases referred to in the report of the Age Tapes Royal
Commission interception was used to assist investigations but not revealed. The
1985 amendments represent the ﬁrst of the recent extensions. To activate the
emergency provisions the matter must involve death or serious injury and a
telephone call from an unknown caller. The sort of thing that is depicted in
television drama where the policeman keeps the caller talking while a technician
traces the call. The provision is essentially for the purpose of locating the caller
and not for gathering evidence of conversations.  
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Further exceptions are provided where a telecommunications service is
used with the authority of telecom (s. 5) to listen to or record a conversation.
This would cover devices such as answering machines. (see R v. McHardie and
Danielson 1983 2 N.S.W. LR 733). The most signiﬁcant exception for present
purposes in interception authorised by a warrant.
The warrant provisions are contained in Part III (ASIO warrants) and
parts IV, V and VI (police warrants). The main features of A810 warrants which
distinguish them from police warrants are that they arise in situations involving
activity prejudicial to national security and they are issued by the Attorney
General. It is in the area of police warrants that there have been signiﬁcant
extensions of power of late.
Part VI of the Act establishes the Telecommunications Interception
Division of the Australian Federal Police and provided for the declaration of
state agencies as eligible authorities. Agencies include the Australian Federal
Police, the National Crime Authority, the Drug Crime Commission and State
and Territory Police Forces. Agencies may make application to a Federal Court
judge (usually) for the issue of a warrant authorising the interception of
telephone communications.
Previously only Australian Federal Police could apply for warrants and
only in respect of Commonwealth narcotics offences. State agencies were almost
' entirely excluded from this method of investigation except where the A.F.P.
furnished information to them in relation to serious State offences which had
been obtained as an incidence of an interception conducted for the purpose of
a Commonwealth narcotics investigation.
Applications for warrants are to be made in writing and must be
supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds on which the application is
based as well as other matters (5. 42). It is also possible to make application by
telephone in urgent circumstances (5. 50). In exercising her/his discretion to
issue a warrant the matters which a judge must have regard to vary accordingly
to the seriousness of the offences. Class 1 and Class 2 offences are distinguished
(ss. 45 (6)).
Class 1 offences include murder, kidnapping, narcotics Offences, and
offences the subject of a special investigation by the National Crime Authority.
Class 2 offences are those punishable by imprisonment for life or a maximum
penalty of at least 7 years and which involve serious injury to persons, serious
damage to property, narcotics trafﬁcking, serious fraud and serious revenue
offences. Stricter tests are applied to the issue of warrants for the lesser class of
offences, It is therefore easier to get a warrant for a Class 1 offence than for a
Class 2 offence. In relation to a Class 2 offence the judge must be satisﬁed of
compliance with the formal requirements in the affidavit. If the application is
made over the telephone the judge must be satisﬁed as to the urgent
circumstances which justify that method of application. It must be demonstrated
that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a particular person is using
or is likely to use the service and that the information obtained from
intercepting the communications is likely to assist the investigation of an offence
by a particular person. In the exercise of his/her discretion the judge must have
regard to the extent of interference with privacy, the gravity of the offence, the
extent to which the information obtained is likely to assist the investigation of
the offence, the extent of use of alternative methods and how much these
methods would be likely to assist or prejudice the investigation. Considerations
or privacy and the gravity of the offence are not part of the criteria for the
exercise of the discretion in respect of Class 1 offences. Similar tests apply to
warrants to intercept telegrams.
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Warrants authorising interception by ASIO are not subject to the same
considerations as the judicial warrants. They are usually issued by the Attorney
General on the advice of the Director General of Security and by the Director
General himself for short periods in emergencies.
The extension of the operation of the Act to offences beyond
Commonwealth narcotics matters is one of the two main areas of extension of
power. The other is the extension to agencies other than the Australian Federal
Police.
Although a number of agencies can apply for warrants only the
Australian Federal Police can exercise the authority of a warrant (s. 55).
Warrants issued to agencies other than the Australian Federal Police do not
come into force until the A.F.P. Commissioner has been notified (s. 54).
Interception may only be effected as a result of action by Telecom ofﬁcers (s.
47). These officers are generally not required to give evidence as there is
provision for a conclusive certiﬁcate relating to their acts (5. 61). The Act
authorises the entry onto premises for the purpose of installing an interception
device in special circumstances (5. 48).
It will be seen from the above that whereas a relatively short time ago
telephone interception warrants were only available on application by'ASIO
ofﬁcers and later Australian Federal Police ofﬁcers (then only in relation to
national security and narcotics matters), the scope has now been substantially
extended to investigations by other agencies and in relation to a range of serious
offences.
Listening Devices
The operation of the Federal law in relation to listening devices remains
restricted in some respects. The primary purpose of 5. 2198 of the Customs Act
1901 is to make it unlawful for members of the A.F.P. to use, for the purposes
of narcotics inquiries that are being made by a member of the A.F.P., a listening
device for the purpose of listening to or recording words being spoken by a
person unless he is the speaker of the words, or is a person by whom it is
intended the words be heard or he has the consent of such a person or he is
authorised by warrant.
This is an unusual provision in that the proscription is limited to certain
circumstances. This form was no doubt thought necessary because of the
limitations of s. 51 of the Constitution. As we have seen, under s. 7 of the .
Interception Act, which is authorised by placitum 51 (v) of the Constitution, all
persons are .generally prohibited from intercepting. Under 5. 2198 of the
Customs Act, only A.F.P. ofﬁcers are effected and only in relation to narcotics
inquiries which they are conducting. A question arises as to whether they may
bug conversations in relation to other matters relying on the general powers and
exemptions conferred on them by the A.F.P. Act 1979 (s. 12). It would be
anomalous for A.F.P. ofﬁcers to be more restricted in relation to the
investigation of narcotics offences than they are in relation to other offences.
Persons other than A.F.P. are prevented from using listening devices in this
State by the Listening Devices Act 1984 (N.S.W.).
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Another distinction is that interception warrants under the extended
authority conferred by the 1987 amendments are available to a range of agencies
and for a range of offences whereas listening device warrants under the Customs
Act are for Commonwealth narcotic matters only. It is also noteworthy that a
warrant is not required for use of a listening device where one party to the
conversation consents to its use. These are the so-called “one party consensual”
recordings which arise where an informant or agent participates in a
conversation while using a listening device to record or transmit the
conversation.
Listening devices under the Customs Act may be obtained in relation to
a particular person or in relation to particular premises. The warrants are
different for each case. “Person” warrants allow the devices to follow the person
as in the case of devices placed in drug packages whereas “premises” warrants
are for stationary devices in the main. “Person” devices may of course be in
premises, but they may move with the person. The warrant authorises entry to
premises for the purpose of installing, removing, maintaining and using devices.
Section 219C speciﬁcally excludes the operation of the section from
authorising interception within the meaning of the Interception Act. Of course,
listening devices may be located in places where they pick up one end of a
telephone conversation and in the case of conference telephones, both ends of
the telephone conversation. As this does not involve interception of a
communication in its passage over the telecommunications system it is not an
interception under the Interception Act.
It has been held that the Interception Act would not be breachedwhere
a recording is made by holding a recorder proximate to the earpiece of a
telephone to record communications from the caller on the other end of the
line without the caller’s consent. It has also been suggested that this conduct
would not contravene the N.S.W. Listening Devices Act because the Interception
Act covers the ﬁeld in relation to telecommunications and therefore the New
South Wales Act has no application to the conduct.
In Miller v. Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269 the High Court was considering
a custody case in which the father sought to tender evidence of conversations
between the mother and the child which he had overheard using an extension
handset. It was asserted that the Listening Devices Act 1960 (N.S.W.), to the
extent to which it prohibited such conduct, was invalid by virtue of s. 109 of
the Constitution as it was inconsistent with the Interception Act. The High Court
held that the Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act 1960 (Cth) intended
to be the whole law on the subject of the interception of telephone
communications and therefore the New South Wales provisions were invalid
to that extent. (see also Edelsten v. Investigating Committee (N.S.W. S Ct
181286) and R v. Oliver (N.S.W. CCA 141284)).
It is often tempting to record without consent telephone conversations
which are likely to be the subject of future controversy. That temptation is
heightened by the availability of a dictaphone tape recorder near the telephone,
or suction caps placed on the telephone or jacks connecting telephones to
recording devices. The ﬁrst method is probably in breach of the New South
Wales Listening Devices Act and the second and third are probably in breach
of the Interception Act or the Telecommunications Act (attaching equipment
without the authority of Telecom) (R v. Padman (1979) 25 ALR 36, cf Curran
v. Torney (1983) 2 VR 632).
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I have included reference to the Customs Act provisions by way of
comparison with the Interception Act where the extensions of power have
occurred. It is remarkable that the Customs Act has received so little legislative
attention in either extending powers beyondtnarcotics investigations (which has
Constitutional limitations) or in the area of safeguards. Apart from a judicial
supervision and restriction of A.F.P. ofﬁcers disclosing information obtained
by use of listening devices there are virtually no safeguard provisions.
The ASIO Act
Section 26 of the A510 Act is in substantially the same terms as 5. 2198
of the Customs Act. However there are some notable differences.
Like the Customs Act it prohibits ASIO agents from using listening
devices for ASIO purpose other than in speciﬁed circumstances—
Owhere the communicator should reasonably have expected the
communication to be overheard, etc.;
0 where the communicator consents;
0 where the communication is recorded pursuant to a warrant.
Warrants are issued by the Attorney General on the request of the
Director General of A810 for the purpose of assisting ASIO in carrying out its
function of obtaining intelligence relevant to security. The Director General may
authorise the use of listening devices in emergencies andlas is the case under
the Interception Act "‘person” and “premises” warrants are available.
A signiﬁcant distinction from Customs Act warrants is that the A810
warrants may authorise the use of a listening device to listen to or record
“words, images, sounds or signals”. “Listening device” is deﬁned in s. 22 as
“any instrument device'or equipment capable of being used whether alone or
in conjunction with any other instrument, device or equipment, to record or
listen to words, images, sounds or signals”. A listening device may therefore
include various types of cameras. Customs Act warrants only authorise the
recording of spoken words. The A810 Act therefore represents the only
prohibition on “optical surveillance”. Though it must be noted that the
prohibition is limited to special circumstances.
Another signiﬁcant distinction is the safeguard provisions. ASIO ofﬁcers
like A.F.P. are speciﬁcally made subject to s. 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 which
prohibits the unauthorised disclosure of information. There are no safeguard
provisions speciﬁc to the use of listening devices by ASIO ofﬁcers.
Listening Devices Act
The New South Wales Listening Devices Act 1984 differs from the
Commonwealth Acts in that it prohibits bugging conversations even where a
party to the conversation consents. To this extent it is an example of a recent
contraction of power. Prior to 1984 the position was roughly equivalent to the
Customs Act provision in that a party to a conversation could record the-
conversation without consent.  
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New South Wales listening device warrants are available in relation to
a wider class of offences being indictable offences or other prescribed offences.
The third main difference is that, except in the case of application for a warrant
by telephone, the applicant or complainant need not be a policeman or officer
of a particular law enforcement agency. Tests similar to those referred to in the
Interception Act apply to the exercise of the judges discretion to issue the
warrant.
The judge must in exercising his/her discretion to grant a warrant have
regard to, the nature of the offence, the effect on the privacy of any person,
alternative methods of investigation, the evidentiary value of the information
sought and any warrant previously granted.
Safeguards
As I have mentioned these Acts are primarily concerned with prohibiting
electronic surveillance except in certain circumstances. There are severe
penalties for breach. In addition there are signiﬁcant limitations on the conduct
which is authorised. Firstly there is the judicial supervision to which I have
already referred. In the case of ASIO supervision is by the Attorney General.
There are a range of other controls. Under the Interception Act, parallel to the
extension of powers there have been a considerable number of safeguards
introduced. There are provisions severely limiting communication of
information obtained. Generally speaking the information may only be passed
to other law enforcement agencies (who themselves are subject to restrictions)
and then only in limited circumstances information may also be given in
evidence in certain proceedings. There are also restrictions on the keeping of
records and provision for inspection by the Ombudsman, reporting conditions
and provision for discontinuance of warrants and destruction of records.
The Customs Act contains less guidance for the issuing judge in the
exercise of his/her discretion. Its provisions dealing with disclosure are less strict
than those found in the Interception Act. The restrictions only apply to A.F.P.
ofﬁcers and do not affect successive possessors of the information. The A510
Act has no safeguard provisions speciﬁc to listening devices.
The New South Wales Act prohibits communication by parties to private
conversations without the consent of other parties except in the course of legal
proceedings or for the protection of lawful interest or in circumstances where
a person has a reasonable interest in knowing. The meaning and scope of these
exceptions is unclear and to this extent the protection offered by the safeguards
is largely illusory.
There is also no restriction on persons who recorded conversation
pursuant to a warrant nor upon persons who got the information by one of the
above means. Similarly the prohibition on possession provides only limited
protection against disclosure. It is an offence to manufacture or supply a
listening device for use in contravention of the Act.  
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A further deterrent to persons who might be seeking to gather evidence
by means of bugging is to be found in speciﬁc statutbry provision and in
common law (Bunning v. Cross (1978) 19 ALR 661 also see Migliorini (1981)
38 ALR 356). The New South Wales Act renders inadmissible evidence
obtained in contravention of the Act unless the parties cbnsent, the evidence
was obtained by other means as well, or a serious offence is involved. Again
this meaning is unclear. The Customs Act and ASIO Act are silent on the point
as was the Interception Act prior to the 1987 amendments. With certain minor
exceptions, s. 77 now makes all intercepted material inadmissible unless lawfully
obtained and then only in speciﬁc proceedings.
The legislation varies on the question of the admissibility of what has
been described as the “fruits of the forbidden tree”. In the USA. the earlier
“fourth amendment” cases' have said that if the method of collection is illegal
then the fruits of that method will be inadmissible. .
The report of the Age Tapes Royal Commission discloses that a number
of persons were convicted on the basis of evidence obtained during
investigations which were substantially assisted by illegal telephone tapping. No
doubt the principles enunciated in Bunning v. Cross will be applied to these
“forbidden fruits” cases in the future. Certainly they are not automatically
excluded by s. 77 of the Interception Act. If a person illegally intercepts a
telephone conversation from which it is gleaned that a particular offence will
occur at a particular time and place, 5. 77 only renders inadmissible the
intercepted information not the evidence of the policeman who happens to be
at the scene of the crime at the critical time. The latter person may not have
committed an offence at all, he may simply act on information received.
Under the Listening Devices Act, where‘a private conversation has come
to the knowledge of a person as a result, direct or indirect, of the illegal use of
a listening device, evidence obtained as a direct consequence of the conversation
coming to the knowledge of that person may not be given by that person. This
of course does not deal with “successors in title” to the information. A
policeman who “happens” to be at the scene of the crime could give evidence
of what he observed.
Conclusion
The main point to be made in conclusion is that there is a lack of
uniformity in approach. The recent extensions of power in the Interception Act
have reduced the inconsistency to some extent. However, there is still a good
deal ,of amendment necessary before uniformity of approach is achieVed,
particularly in the area of optical and signal surveillance, “party consensual
conversations” and in the area of safeguards.
There, is also a lack of uniformity in the way the various jurisdictions
approach the subject of surveillance. In some jurisdictions, listening devices are
not the subject of legislation. In others’the legislation is at variance with
Commonwealth Legislation. Throughout Australia the approach to wireless
telegraphy and overseas telecommunications is quite different to other forms of
electronic surveillance.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Phillip Bradley
The title of the paper is the “Recent Extensions of Power” in the area
of electronic surveillance. You will see that I have strayed into another area;
that is the inconsistency of legislation in this area: not just legislation applying
as between the Commonwealth and States but as between various State
jurisdictions. To demonstrate this second theme I will refer to a number of other
pieces of legislation in the area other than the one in which the extensions of
power have occurred.
The extensions of power, as you have heard, are substantially in 'the area
of telephone interceptions with the advent of the 1987 Telephone,
Telecommunications (Amendment) Act which I think has not yet been
proclaimed (certainly it wasn’t a few days ago) and therefore is not currently
in force. My paper is directed at the legislation as it will apply once it has been
proclaimed. The other piecesof legislation to which I have referred to in the
paper are the Customs Act which is a Commonwealth Act. It has within it a
provision which authorises the Australian Federal Police to use listening devices
for the purposes of investigations into narcotics offences. I will also refer to the
A510 Act which gives similar power to AISO ofﬁcers in national security
matters, and the Listening Devices Act (N.S.W.) which authorises a wide range
of people to use listening devices in relation to a wide range of offences.
On the subject of the scope of the conduct proscribed perhaps I could
commence the discussion with an anecdote which should indicate that not just
Dr Edelsten, Mr Peacock, Mr Kennett and one or two others are suffering at
the hands of illegal interceptors. There is a fellow in Newcastle who had a phone
installed in his car, and he had heard about .the scanners who listened on the
wavelength of radio telephones installed in cars, and so by prearrangement with
a friend he drove to a beach , near Newcastle, telephoned the friend and
announced that there were a number of women cavorting naked on the
particular beach. Within a few minutes something like a dozen cars converged
on the beach all with male drivers and all sporting prominent radio aerials.
Which serves to demonstrate that there is a great deal of illegal conduct in the
area and not for purposes which can be justiﬁed in the way that some of the
other notorious illegal conduct has been justiﬁed in the past. In that context it
is important to note that the legislation in the area is not so much designed to
facilitate this sort of activity but to proscribe it. In that context I mention some
commentary that has been recently approved by Mr Justice Finlay in the
Supreme Court (see page 23). In the United States Mr Justice Douglas said of
electronic surveillance:
What the ancients knew as eavesdropping, we now call
electronic surveillance. But to equate the two is to treat man’s ﬁrst
gunpowder at the same level as the nuclear bomb. Electronic
surveillance is the greatest leveller of human privacy ever known.
Mr Justice Finlay proceeded to convict some media persons and a
production company in relation to the illegal listening to and recording of a
conversation to which a talent scout who did not consent.
1 have mentioned that the legislation in the area is inconsistent and I
have mentioned also that it is a problem of inconsistency between jurisdictions.
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The absence of listening device legislation has meant that private conversations
can be lawfully recorded without consent or other authority. Where there is no
listening devices legislation the interceptions legislation can be sidestepped by
recording a communication after it has passed over the telecommunications
system. In jurisdictions where there is no listening devices Act you can not only
listen to private conversations and record them but also you can hold a
microphone proximate to the earpiece of a telephone and in that way record
without consent messages which are passing over the telecommunications
system. It is arguable, by the way, that even in jurisdictions where there is
listening device legislation that such legislation is ineffective to the extent to
which it purports to proscribe the sort of conduct I have just described.
There are a number of other forms of electronic surveillance which are
not proscribed at all and there has been a fairly selective prohibition of
surveillance in general. Photographic surveillance has not had a great deal of
attention and it is probably due to the fact that people conduct their affairs in
public or in circumstances where they are likely to be photographed in a more
circumspect way than they do, for example, on the telephone where the prospect
of being heard through a crossed line or an extension telephone is somewhat
greater. The only exception to prohibition on visual surveillance is to be found
surprisingly in the A810 Act and I come to that a little bit later.
It also needs to be said «that in this area all forms of electronic
communication are capable of interception and whilst it is possible to have hard
wire communications and encrypted communications on hard wire most of
those are also vulnerable. Hard wires are often cumbersome and encryption is
both cumbersome and expensive.
I will not take you to the civil remedies aspects of this area though it is
fairly clear from each of the papers that there is very little in the way of civil
remedies for the sort of encroachment on' privacy that occur through the use of
electronic surveillance.
It is also important to be aware of the areas which are vulnerable to
electronic surveillance. In addition to the ones that we are familiar with such
as recorded private conversations and the bugging of telephone conversations,
computer systems are particularly vulnerable including electronic mailing
systems, accounting machines, Fax machines, telephone lines, microwave links,
and various things like that. There is a very interesting television program which
is produced by Horizon and it is available from the ABC. for those of you
who have a thirst for this sort of thing, which demonstrates how easy it is to
intercept computer communications. To the unassisted ear the communications
sound like a series of blips over the telephone. All you need is a two dollar
interception device placed in a Telecom distribution panel, which just about
everybody in this room would have in their building and which is usually very
acCessible to the public, and usually comes with a little manual which Telecom
places in there for the assistance of interceptors which tells you which line
belongs to which person. You can place these little devices across the lines; and
with a cheap FM receiver, a modem, and a printer, you can decipher all of the
computer communications passing over the telephone line. There is a great deal
of that going on as we know. All devices which use telephone lines are
vulnerable.
I will not deal with the legislation in any detail because Graham Blewett
has covered it in large measure. The Telephone Interception Act in its form  
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following the proclamation largely arises out of the Select Committee Report.
That Report identiﬁed the competing interests with which you are all familiar;
they are the public interests, in protecting privacy, and in detecting criminals.
Basically the Report recommends that the 1979 Act be restructured to extend
the powers, to increase the number of agencies to whom the powers were
available, and to improve safeguards. The Select Committee did not agree, by
the way, as was recommended by the Age Tapes Royal Commission and by a
number of other interested groups, that various agencies should have their own
interception powers. The National Crime Authority, and the State police forces,
the State Drug Crime Commission under the new Act will have to go through
the Australian Federal Police for the act of interception.
Interception is deﬁned in the Act, as meaning the listening to or
recording by any means communications passing over the telecommunications
system without the knoweldge of the person making the communication. There
are a number of exceptions such as Telecom officers working on the system and
tracing. Recently there was an amendment which permitted interception for the
purpose of tracing calls in emergencies. That was introduced to cover the
kidnap/extortion type situations but it is not designed as an evidence collecting
mechanism. It is really a device by which the callers can be traced, and
identiﬁed, and apprehended. However, there does not seem to be any
prohibition on using it as a means of collecting evidence. Prior to that fairly
minor amendment the only basis upon which telephone interceptions could be
carried out was by the Australian Federal Police in relation to narcotic matters,
and by ASIO in relation to national security matters. There had, of course, been
a number of instances of interceptions carried out by people prior to that, most
of which were illegal, although some evidence was adduced in some prosecution
which were admitted in evidence, and, of course, some of it was not. Some very
notable instances of very successful illegal interception remained unrevealed
until the Age Tapes Royal commission. There were cases such as the “ANOA”
importation where a record amount of cannabis was brought into Australia and
the investigation was substantially assisted by the intelligence received through
intercepting the telephones of the conspirators. Those people were ultimately
convicted and the role of the telephone interception investigation methods
wasn’t revealed until some years later.
There a number of other exceptions to the general prohibition on
interception. I have mentioned there answering machines. The most important
is contained in the warrant provisions. I have indicated that interception
warrants had been limited to A.F.P. and ASIO. The amendments will have the
effect of extending the agencies to include the State Forces, the State Drug
Crime Commission, the National Crime Authority and also extending the range
of offences for which the warrants are available. Those offences are basically
divided into Class 1 and Class 2 offences, Class 1 offences being the more
serious variety. Warrants for the more serious variety of offences are easier to
get. In relation to the Class 2 offences the judge who is issuing the warrant must
have regard to the likely use of the service by the person identiﬁed as suspected
of committing offences, the likely assistance to the derived in the investigation,
the extent of the interference with privacy, the gravity of the offence, and
alternative methods of investigations. In relation to the Class 1 offences
questions of privacy and gravity of the offence are not part of the considerations
of the issuing judge. I have mentioned also that the Australian Federal Police
are the only ones who can exercise the authority of the Act and the State police
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do not have the power to intercept.
I would like to turn now to the listening device legislation. Basically in
this State there are two important pieces of legislation, perhaps three. The
Customs Act I have already mentioned. It is an unusual provision in that it
states:
That it is unlawful for the members of the Australian Federal
Police to use for the purpose of narcotics enquiries that are being
made by them listening devices for the purpose of listening to etc . . .
unless they have a warrant. The way that that section is worded is no doubt
due to the Constitution limitations but it raises a number of anomalies. If one
gives the widest interpretation to 5.12 of the Australian Federal Police Act, which
by the way authorises .the Australian Federal Police to carry out their
investigations without the need for permits from State authorities, then the
effect of that Act and the Customs Act is that the Australian Federal Police are
more restricted in the use of listening devices in relation to narcotic matters
than they are in relation to other crimes. The Commonwealth listening devices
provisions permit what are known as one part consensual conversations to be
recorded so that if a police agent or an informer is prepared to participate in a
conversation with a recording device then that recording is not prohibited by
the Act. That is to be distinguished from the Interceptions Act where both parties
must consent and the New South Wales Listening Devices Act where (since
1984) both parties must consent.
The Commonwealth customs provisions provide for “person” warrants,
and “premises” warrants. Basically the distinction is that a ‘person’ warrant is
obtained to intercept conversations in relation to a particular person and the
listening device can therefore follow the person around, and ‘premises’ warrants
are generally installed in particular premises and do not move. A typical
example of a person warrant is one that is placed in a drug package which is
intercepted by police and as the package passes from person to person the
conversations are picked up.
Listening devices can record one end of telephone conversations
particularly in the case of a listening device placed proximate to a telephone in
a room, and in the case of conference phones (which are used more these days)
you can pick up both ends of the telephone conversation. I have mentioned
also the method of holding the listening device close to the handset of a
telephone so that you can listen probably without breaking the law. Miller v.
Miller is a case on this which is referred to in the paper as is Edelsten’s case
(page 28). I have mentioned also some of the techniques that are used.
I think that one of the most interesting distinctions between the two
pieces of Commonwealth legislation, i.e. the Telephone Interception-Act and the -
Customs Act, is that the Telephone Interception Act goes into a great deal of
detail on the subject of safeguards whereas the Customs Act hardly deals with
it at all. Apart from the judicial supervision which is a very important safeguard,
the Customs Act only prohibits the passing on of information by the Australian
Federal Police.
. The A510 Act is substantially in the same terms as the Customs Act. An
interesting distinction is that the ASIO Act purports to restrict the use of devices
which record images, sounds, and signals. Now the Customs Act only deals with
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sounds, as does the Interceptions Act and the New South Wales Listening Devices
Act. The A510 Act is a fairly rare creature in this area.
The New South Wales Listening Devices Act since 1984 has prohibited
even one party consensual conversations and there are a number of guidelines
there for the assistance of the issuing judge which are not dissimilar to those
found in the amendments to the Interceptions Act.
The area of safeguards, as I have said, is an area where there are
considerable inconsistencies, the ﬁrst point from which you must proceed is that
these Acts prohibit certain conduct and there are severe penalties for breach.
They usually have judicial supervision which despite what is said about the
number of warrants which are applied for and granted, or the fact that there
are so few refused, is a very important safeguard.
The A510 Act is an exception in this area. The supervision is by the
Attorney General and in emergency cases where the Attorney'General is not
available, the Director General of A810 can arrange for the issue of a warrant
himself for a short period. There is also mirror State legislation in relation to
the Interceptions Act which contains similar safeguards including inspections by
the Ombudsman, reporting, and things like that, keeping of records, destruction
of records and discontinuance of warrants. There matters are not dealt with in
the Customs Act. Guidance for the issuing judge is contained within the
Commonwealth Interceptions Act, the New South Wales Listening Devices Act,
but not in the other Acts. One area where there is' a fairly yawning gap in
protection is that successors in title to information are not restricted under most
of the legislation. '
The New South Wales Act prohibits communication by parties to private
conversation without the consent of the other party except in the course of legal
proceedings, for the protection of lawful interests, or in circumstances where a
person has a reasonable interest in knowing. The meaning and scope of these
exceptions is unclear and to that extent protection offered by the safeguards is
largely illusory. There is also restriction on persons who recorded conversations
pursuant to warrant, passing on that information. There are offences relating
to manufacture and supply. Another significant matter in this area is the
question of admissibility of evidence. Most of the Acts contain a provision
dealing with that and where they do not there is some fairly strong common
law on the subject. Bunning v. Cross had quite a bit to say about it.
One area of continuing inconsistency and which is a problem that will
probably be dealt with by the courts before long, is what is known in America
as “the fruits of the forbidden tree”. That expression relates to situations where
a person lawfully, or even illegally, records or intercepts converations and then
lawfully or illegally passes it to another person who himself is perhaps not
involved in an offence. The second person uses that information in the course
of an investigation which lead to admissible evidence. The principle also applies
where the originator of the recording uses the information as intelligence and
turns up at the scene of the crime and obtains evidence. He would not have
been there but for the fact that he illegally obtained information by means of
electronic survelliance. Those cases present real problems, because on the one
hand courts seek to dissuade the illegal electronic survelliance but on the other
they may feel obliged to admit evidence which itself is not illegally obtained.
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. There are some old Fourth Amendment cases in the United States which
basically say that derivative evidence obtained where somewhere up the chain
there was an illegal act won’t be admitted. The US. authorities are apparently
tending to go the other way these days.
I have mentioned the speciﬁc provisions dealing with admissibility. In
particular 5. 77 of the new Interception Act contains an absolute prohibition on
the admissibility of the illegally obtained evidence.
In conclusion I would just like to mention two things. Firstly, to make
the point that there is a lack of uniformity both between jurisdictions and within
jurisdictions and secondly, that there is a lack of attention given to optical and
signal surveillance and party consensual conversations. I should also mention
that in the area of wireless telegraphy and overseas telecommunications there
has been a lack of legislation attention to questions of privacy and authority.
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LIMITS ON SURVEILLANCE: SAFEGUARDS OR SHAMS?
Beverley Schurr B.A., LL.B., Dip.Lib.,
Solicitor, Legal Aid Commission of N.S.W.
A. THE EXTENT OF SURVEILLANCE
Electronic surveillance technology and its use is growing so fast that
much of it is outside the law. Some categories of surveillance technology and
its uses are set out below:'
Table l.—Categories of Surveillance Technology
1. Electronic eavesdropping technology (audio surveillance)
0 radiating devices and receivers (e.g., miniaturized transmitters)
o non-radiating devices (e.g., wired surveillance systems, including
telephone taps and concealed microphones)
o tape recorders
2. Optical/imaging technology (Visual surveillance)
0 photographic techniques
0 television (closed circuit and cable)
0 night vision devices (use image intensiﬁer to view objects under
low light)
0 satellite based
3. Computers and related technologies (Data surveillance)
omicrocomputers—decentralisation of machines and distributed
processing
0 computer networks
0 software (e.g., expert systems)
0 pattern recognition systems
4. Sensor technology
0 magnetic sensors
0 seismic sensors
0 infrared sensors
0 strain sensors
0 electromagnetic sensors
5. Other devices and technologies
0 citizen band radios
0 vehicle location systems .
o machine-readable magnetic strips
0 polygraph
0 voice stress analyzer
0 voice recognition
0 laser interception
O cellular radio
SOURCE: Based on the framework developed by the Senate Judiciary Committee‘s Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
in its repon. Surveillance Technology—I976 (See pp. 29-37).
' US Congress Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment. Federal Government Information Technology,
Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties (Washington, USGPO, October 1985): 13.
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Table 2.—Categories of Behaviour Subject to Electronic Surveillance
l. Movements—where someone is. Individuals can be tracked
electronically via beepers as well as by monitoring computerised
transactional accounts in real time.
2. Actions—what someone is doing or has done. Electronic devices to
monitor action include: monitoring of keystrokes on computer
terminals, monitoring of telephone numbers called with pen registers,
cable TV monitoring, monitoring of ﬁnancial and commercial
computerised accounts, and accessing computerised law enforcement
or investigatory systems.
3. Communications—what someone is saying or writing, and hearing
or receiving. Two-way electronic communications can be intercepted
whether the means be analog or digital communication via wired
telephones, communication via cordless or cellular phones, or digital
electronic mail communication. Two-way non-electronic
communication can be intercepted via a variety of microphone
devices and other transmitters.
4. Actions and communications—the details of what someone is doing
or saying. Electronic visual surveillance, generally accompanied by
audio surveillance, can monitor the actions and communications of
individuals in both private and public places, in daylight or darkness.
5. Emotions—the psychological and physiological reactions to
circumstances. Polygram testing, voice stress analysers, breath
analysers, and brain wave analysers attempt to determine an
individual’s reactions.
SOURCE: Oﬁice of Technology Assessment.
 
In Australia, even the technology which is regulated is subject to little
public oversight and control.
This paper attemps to assess the extent of both legal and illegal
surveillance in Australia and assess the effectiveness of checks on the use of
electronic surveillance by police and other government agencies.
Statistics on Australian warrant-based tapping
About 175 phone tap warrants are issued in Australia each year—an
average of eighty-four to the Australian Federal Police2 and ninty-one to ASIO.3
That is equal to a new warrant being issued every second day. An A.F.P.
warrant lasts on average 64 days. These ﬁgures are based on the statistics
released in the only two instances of ofﬁcial declarations on the incidence of
phone tapping in Australia.
Over 8 000 Australians have their telephone conversations overheard
every year as a consequence, and over 100 000 conversations wOuld be recorded
per year. These ﬁgures are calculated by averaging U.S. statistics of the number
of people and the number of conversations heard per intercept.4 The resulting
average is 50 people and 600 conversations overheard per intercept.
14 Australian Federal Police. Submission to the Joint Select Committee on Telecommunications
Interception. Edited Version (Submission No. 2, released by the Committee on 25.8.86). Annual
ﬁgures calculated on the basis of statistics for the 17-month period 1.1.85 to 31.5.86.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates. House of Representatives 12.4. 73: 1461. Answer to a
Question on Notice by the Minister representing the Attorney General Statistics include the
number of warrants issued to ASIO each year in the period 1963-64 to 1972-73. As at 7. 3. 73
there were ninteen ASIO warrants in force.
4 US Administrative Ofﬁce of United States Courts. Annual Report. See also Schwartz, Herman
Taps. Bugs and Fooling the People (NY, Field Foundation, 1977).
u
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The average cost per intercept to the AER is $75,000,5 which could
amount to $6.3 million per annum if eighty-four warrants are issued. .
The police and ASIO have the capacity to effect even more intercepts.
They can monitor up to seventy six lines at any given time (thirty-eight lines
each) and their average daily operating capacity is thirty (ﬁfteen lines each).6
During the 17 month period from lst January, 1985 to 3lst May, 1986,
the Australian Federal Police monitored 7 502 days of conversations under the
auspices of l 17 warrants. The Australian Federal Police statistics do not reveal
how many if any extensions were granted to warrants, but the following material
can be extracted:7
(1) Number of code-named operations—32.
(2) Number of warrants issued—117.
(3) Average length of warrants—64 days.
(4) Total duration of warrants—7 502 days.
(5) Average number of warrants per “operation”—3.
(6) Number of warrants issued—according to length:
3 months 39 18 days ' l
2 months 46 15 days 2
1 month 16 14 days 1
10 weeks 1 12 days 1
6 weeks 6 8 days 1
24 days 1 7 days 1
22 days 1 3 days 1
(7) Number of warrants per code-named operation:
No. of Warrants No. of Operations
1 9
2 4
3 7
4 3
5 4
6 3
7 __
8 1
21 1
During this period, warrants could only be obtained by Australian
Federal Police in relation to narcotics offences (s. 20) and in situations where
a person’s life was in jeopardy (s. 7 (2) (c), 1985 amendment). The maximum
length of a warrant was 6 months (5. 20(5)) with no limit on the number of
renewals that could be applied for (s. 20 (6)).
5 See footnote 2 above.
6 Australian Parliament. Joint Select Committee on Telecommunication Interception. Report
(AGPS, I986): para l.l5. p. 8.
7 See footnote 2 above. 
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Extent of use of listening devices ‘
There is no regulation of listening devices in Tasmania, the A.C.T. or
the Northern Territory. In those states with listening devices legislation
(including Queensland’s Invasion of Privacy Act) only South Australia and
N.S.W. require an annual report to Parliament on the use of such devices.
The brief annual reports provided under s. 6 (2) of the South Australian
Listening Devices Act 1972, reveal the followingrnumber of warrants issued:
1973 0
1974 (no report found)
1975 (no report found)
1976 .
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981 44 (re 2 separate inquiries)
1982 2
1983+ (no reports found)
H
N
O
O
O
The N.S.W Listening Devices Act, 1984 commenced on 11th February,
1985. Section 23 of the Act requires that an annual report to Parliament be
prepared after the 3lst December each year. Two such reports have been tabled
.in Parliament, although they are not available for purchase in the ordinary way
from the N.S.W. Government bookshop or printer.
The ﬁgures reveal extensive use of bugging by police:
1985 1 86
1. Taps placed without warrants where there is
alleged imminent threat of serious violence
to persons or substantial damage to property
or in connection with serious narcotics
offences 3 2
2. Taps for which warrants have been obtained
from judgesin chambers 88 157
3. Taps for'which warrants have been obtained
by telephone applications to judges 16 48
Total 1 7 207
Comparing the 1986 N.S.W‘ bugging rate with the annual national
average phone tapping rate shows the following:
1. Number of national phone tap warrants ................ 175 ’
2. Number of N.S.W police bugging warrants ............. 207
That is, there is morebugging going on in N.S.W. than there is phone
tapping Australia-wide
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Ofﬁcers of the Australian Federal Police and ASIO may obtain listening
devices warrants in relation to suspected narcotics (Customs Act 1901,
5. 219B (1)) and national security matters (ASIO Act 1979, s. 26). It may be that
Australian Federal Police ofﬁcers are not bound by state legislation.8 Federal,
police are not required to obtain permission under state laws to perform their
federal duties (Australian Federal Police Act 1979, s. 12) and the state laws could
be invalid for s. 109 inconsistency.
A group of cases, known as Peters and Ors, is currently before the N.S.W.
Court of Appeal and may resolve the s. 109 point relating to listening devices.
Extent of illegal surveillance
There have been many examples of illegal police phone tapping in
Australia. The best known is the 16-year operation in N.S.W. from 1967 to
1983, described in the Stewart Royal Commission report9 and involving:
(1) 105 N.S.W. police ofﬁcers, 9 Victorian police ofﬁcers and 10
members of the Australian Federal Police; .
(2) over 200 interceptions; and
(3) interceptions which continued for a “considerable” period of time
(sometimes even after a person had been charged).
Other examples of illegal police tapping in N.S.W. and Queensland from
1964 to 1972 are set out in the 1975 Australian Law Reform Commission report
on Criminal Investigation.'0
Telecom found thirty-four illegal bugs in its telephone system in the 4-
year period from 1982—83 to 1985—86, but there has only been one successful
prosecution arising out of those discoveries.ll
The easy availability of listening devices, bugs and scanners in local
electronics shops has opened up the area of illegal interceptions to amateurs (as
Peacock and Kennett discovered) as well as to semi-professionals (note the
private information laid against persons associated with the Mike Willesee
program for a breach of the N.S.W. Listening Devices Act).
The 1986 Federal Parliamentary Committee report devoted twenty pages
to the problems of illegal interceptions, but the federal government has not
accepted the committee’s recommendation that certain devices be made
prohibited imports and that the manufacture, sale, advertising, possession and
installation of electronic interception devices be made illegal.
It should also be noted that some very obtrusive surveillance devices
are not regulated by law at all. There is no regulation of lie detectors except in
N.S.W. (Lie Detectors Act 1983). There is no regulation of video. recording,
which—by itself or in conjunction with listening devices—is potentially more
prejudicial to accused persons in criminal proceedings than audio surveillance
alone.
5 Australian Law Reform Commission. Privacy. Report No. 22 (AGPS, 1983) vol. 1: pp. 347—348.
9 Australian Royal Commission into Alleged Telephone Interceptions. Report, vol. 1: para. 16.11,
p. 338 (AGPS, 1986) Commissioner: Mr Justice Stewart.
'0 Australian Law Reform Commission. Criminal Investigation Interim Report No. 2 (AGPS,
1975): para. 21, pp. 102—103. '
" ibid at footnote 6 above, at p. 143, Table 5.1.
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The extent of surveillance overseas
How does the Australian rate of surveillance compare internationally?
Of course, State surveillance is lawful in many military and other
dictatorships. General Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution permits telephone tapping
in his now partly-privatised Chilean telephone system, an interest in which was
recently purchased by Alan Bond. In Poland in the years of martial law in 1981
and 1982, an ofﬁcial recorded message of warning preceded every telephone
connection in the Polish telephone system. It said:l2
ROZMOWA KONTROLOWANA (This call is being controlled).
When martial law was lifted in December, 1982, that message was
discontinued but the Poles believe that the tapping continues—without the
courtesy of the formal advance warning.
It is difﬁcult to compare the Australian surveillance rate with other
comparable western democratic countries. There is no annual statistical report
in Britain (Interception of Communications Act 1985). The detailed annual
statistical reports published in Canada'3 and the US.” refer to slightly different
kinds of legislation and cover different types of tapping. The following
comparisons are set out below, some figures involving the application of US
statistics to the numbers of persons overheard per interception discussed in
footnote 4 above:
U.S. ' 5 Canadal 6 Australia'7
(1984) (1985) (1985—6)
(pop: 250m) (pop: 25m) (pop: 16m)
Number of warrants issued per annum 801 59184
Number of warrants per million 3.2 24 5
population
Number of persons overheard per 40 000 30 000 4200
annum
Number of persons overheard per 160 1200 262
million population
Only Canada includes national security matters in its statistics. The US.
and Canadian ﬁgures include warrants for listening devices. They do not include
warrants for phone taps and listening devices in situations where one of the
parties to a conversation agrees to the conversation being recorded by law
enforcement ofﬁcers.
'1 New Yorker, 18th April, 1983:90.
'3 Canada. Criminal Code, 5. 178.22.
'4 Annual ﬁgure obtained from: US. Congress. Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment. Electronic
Surveillance and Civil Liberties (USGPO, 1985). Statistics published as required by 18 USC
2519.
'5 ibia’ p.13.
'6 Canada. Solicitor General. Annual Report as required by the Criminal Code of Canada.
5. 178.22 (I985).
'7 see footnote 2 above.
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B. PROTECTIONS AND REMEDIES AGAINST STATE
SURVEILLANCE
The role of the courts—the issue of warrants
A common late-twentieth century response to concern about state
surveillance has been to make judges responsible for the issue of warrants
permitting surveillance. The expectation was that judges would not simply
rubber stamp applications.
The available evidence is that judges in fact approve almost 100 per cent
of the applications made before them for warrants.18 In 1984, for example, US.
judges approved 801 out of 802 of the applications for electronic surveillance
warrants.l9 In 1985, Canadian judges approved all 591 applications.20
In these ex parte hearings, judges face an almost impossible task. A real
life example is set out below in an extract from a judgment in a Canadian case.
The judge presiding at the trial had coincidentally been the judge to whom
application had been made for phone tap warrants in the earlier investigation
of the offence. After having had the opportunity to see all of the evidence during
the trial, he stated in his judgment:
I do not think that a judge unassisted on an ex parte
application, and in my case at any rate, without familiarity with the
investigative procedures usually undertaken by 'the police, can
properly protect this important right of private communication from
infringement, whether the infringement is intended or not by the
police. Here I do not refer to actions of the police . . . which might
be characterised as fraudulent, deceptive, or for an unlawful purpose
. . . I believe that contravention of the legislation would be much more
likely to arise out of an understandable and perhaps commendable
determination of police to use every means available to gather as
much evidence as possible in the course of an investigation. And I
think it would be understandable if in the process the police might,
in certain circumstances, be inclined to stretch a point and to shut
their eyes to this newly-created right (of privacy). R v. Wong, 33
C.C.C. (2d) 506, 510 (B.C.S.C. 1976).
The judge proceeded to refuse to admit into evidence material gathered
as a result of the phone tap warrant he had issued. He excluded it because he
found that there was no proper basis for the issue of the warrant in the ﬁrst
place. He went behind his own warrant.
The new warrant issuing procedures proposed in the 1987 Australian
amendments fall short of the protections in place in North America. For the
majority of offences (s. 5, 45) judges do not have to take into account either
privacy interests or the extent to which other methods of investigation have
been tried and failed.
The new warrant procedure proposed also fails to protect legal
professional privilege. The Canadian legislation protects this privilege without
impeding the investigation of crimes suspected of having been committed by
lawyers (Canada. Criminal Code. 5. 178. 13 (1.1) & (1.2)).
'3 Valeriote. ‘Judicial' Authorisation for Wiretap: An lllusionary Protection’, (1980) 12 Ottawa
Law Review 215.
'9 See footnote 15 above.
2° See footnote 16 above.
45
 
The new federal warrant procedure also fails to include the innovation
in the N.S.W. Listening Devices Act requiring notice to be given to the Attorney
General of proposed applications for listening device warrants (s. 17 (1)). Such
a warrant cannot be granted until the court is satisﬁed that the Attorney General
has had an opportunity to be heard in relation to the granting of the warrant
(s. 17 (2)). That provision allows for some public interest input into the ex parte
proceedings.
The role of the courts—challenging the warrant
Challenges to the circumstances in which warrants are issued is part of
the legislative framework in the US. (18 USC 2518). Traditionally, courts have
also examined the validity of searches (Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 State
Trials 1029). In Australia, there seems to be a retreat from this supervisory role.
In Hilton v. Wells ((1985) 59 ALR 281, Wilcox J. Federal Court of
Australia) the applicants sought access to the afﬁdavit material produced in
support of the application for phone tap warrants. Wilcox J. examined the
afﬁdavit material and refused access to the applicants and their legal advisers
on the ground of public interest immunity. The applicants had argued that to
deny them access to the afﬁdavits effectively freed the warrant issuing process
from the supervision of the courts. They also argued that some of the warrants
had been issued for purposes not related to the suspected narcotics offences
referred to on the warrants. Wilcox J. dismissed the application while at the
same time ﬁnding himself unable to fully set out his grounds for fear of releasing
some of the material suppressed.
A request for access to afﬁdavit material tendered in support of an
application for listening devices warrants is currently before the N.S.W. Court
of Appeal (Peters & Ors). The avenues of appeal relating to listening devices
are unclear and include the common law and administrative law divisions of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeal and the Court of Appeal.
The irony is that following the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in
Murdoch (unreported CCA, 15th December, 1987) N.S.W. courts may refuse
to exercise supervision over the Warrant process. The Court of Criminal Appeal
held:
There is every reason to anticipate that the legislature may
have intended that there should not be any review of the issue of
warrants such as these (listening device warrants). Ibid, p. 12.
In Canada, the legislation requires the issuing judge to be satisﬁed of
certain things (5. 178. 13 (1)), but litigants wishing to go behind the warrants
are frustrated by s. 178. 14 (1) which strictly limits access to the material
supplied to the issuing judge.
In the United States, the legislative scheme provides for pre-trial taint
hearings to challenge the validity warrants and the material obtained thereunder
(18 USC 2518)“. A wide range of background material has been supplied to
applicants during the course of those proceedings, including:
1. electronic surveillance agent reports and inter-ofﬁce memoranda;
2' National Lawyers Guild. Raising and Litigaling Electronic Surveillance Claims in Criminal
Cases. (San Francisco, Lake Law Books, 1977).
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2. in-camera inspection of the government’s written investigative ﬁle
and co-defendant’s statements;
3. the identity of a conﬁdential informer; and
4. tapes of the accused person and associates.
Applicants in the US. can cross-examine agents and ofﬁcials who
participated in the surveillance. The public interest is protected not by
withholding material from the applicants but by “protective orders” issued
under Rule 16 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which limit the
disclosure of material beyond the parties and their legal advisers. Once equipped
with such information applicants have succeeded in having material excluded
from proceedings for the following reasons:
1. Failure of the judge to ensure that alternative investigation
procedures had been tried or would be unlikely to succeed (US v.
Giordano, 416 US 505 (1974)).
2. Failure of law enforcement authorities to name known persons in
a warrant (US v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d. 996 (1975)).
3. Misrepresentations contained in the government application for the
warrant (US v'. Bayrzes 400 F.Supp. 284, 296—7 (1975)).
4. “Rubber stamp” and l6-second approvals by judges—US v.
Wallen, 315 F.Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1970), US v. Weaver, 336
F.Supp. 558 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
The retreat of the Australian courts from an oversight role ignores both
the “protective order” type procedure and the historical role of oversighting
government search powers.
In 1765 the English Lord Chief Justice examined justiﬁcations for the
issue of general search warrants in a case that remains relevant today, despite
the changes in technology. He rejected two arguments for state surveillance still
popular today with Australian police organisations to justify intrusive searches
(Entick v. Carrirzgton (1765) 19 State Trials 1029). Lord Camden found that
the warrants were invalid. In the process he rejected the utility argument put
forward by the Crown that any procedure which assists the gathering of evidence
and identiﬁcation of offenders should be accepted by the courts, commenting
that some powers may prove “more pernicious to the innocent than useful to
the public” (at 1073). Lord Camden also rejected the argument that “state
necessity” justiﬁed government agents acting in ways not authorised by
Parliament but judged necessary by the Executive. His Honour gave examples
of ofﬁcials who had been impeached or “committed to the Tower” for adopting
such a view.
Australian legislative oversight of electronic surveillance is further
complicated by constitutional issues. The decision as to whether state or federal
laws apply may depend on how close the surveillance device got to the telephone
wire (e.g. R v. Migliorini (1981) 38 ALR 356; R v. Oliver (1985) 57 ALR 543).
Different standards can lead to disputes about the appropriate forum, as seen
in the federal/state argument in Edelstein v. Investigating Committee ofNS. W.
((1986) 7 NSWLR 222).
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Public scrutiny through detailed annual reports
The 1987 amendments to the federal telephone tap Act provide for an
annual statistical report to Parliament, but omit to include statistics which are
more telling about the politically-sensitive human and ﬁnancial costs of
telephone tapping. The following material is published in North American
annual statistical reports and will not be published in Australia:
(1) The number of persons overheard per warrant (18 USC 2519
(2) (b) (iii))-
(2) The number of conversations intercepted per warrant (18 USC
2519 (2) (b) (i) and (ii)).
(3) The approximate nature, amount, and cost of the manpower
and other resources used in the interceptions (18 USC 2519
(2) (b) (M)-
(4) Statistics on the number of national security warrants issued
(included in annual reports in Canada since the 1984
amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.
Three such taps were reported in the 1985 Annual Report of
the Canadian Solicitor General).
The US. ﬁgures, while not perfect, do provide a concrete picture of the
privacy'impact of this style of criminal investigation.
The omission of costing assessments is also a serious defect in the 1987
legislation. These ﬁgures can be assessed by the Australian Federal Police. In
their August 1986 submission to the Joint Select Committee on
Telecommunication Interception the AFP. set out the following stafﬁng and
costs estimates:22
To effectively manage and maintain ﬁfteen intercepts on a
continuous 24 hours a day basis, there is a stafﬁng requirement currently
committed by the A.FP. of:
One Superintendent; one Chief Inspector, four StatiOn Sergeants,
one Sergeant, twenty--four Constables.
To forecast the cost of an interception is difﬁcult. Taking .into
account, however, monitoring equipment, computers, word processing
equipment, support staff, consumables, power, Telecom line hire, but
excluding capital costs, the annual cost per intercept is approximately
$75,000. ,
Regular and detailed reports on the costs of interceptions is the only way
that the public can truly weigh up the competing interests involved in telephone
tapping.23
Scrutiny through Parliamentary oversight of organisations
The 1987 amendments to the federal phone tap Act propose to expand
the power to tap both to new organisations and to an expanded number of
offences. The bodies that will be able to apply for phone tap warrants will be:
’1 See footnote 2 above.
’3 American Civil Liberties Union. The Costs and Beneﬁts of Electronic Surveillance (NY,
December 1971).
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Australian Federal Police;
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation;
State police forces;
National Crime Authority; and
5. N.S.W. State Drug Crime Commission.
9
8
“
.
”
?
These are new powers for the last three organisations. What
Parliamentary oversight will there be of these organisations use of their new
powers?
The 1987 amendments propose Ombudsman-style oversight of the
exercise of the phone tap powers by the police and crime commissions.
However, these Ombudsman reports will not be made public but will go to
relevant Ministers (Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1987,
new 3. 82; Telecommunications (Interception) (New South Wales) Act, 1987. s.
9).
The National Crime Authority is subject to the scrutiny of a special
Parliamentary Committee which reports to Parliament on the operations of that
organisation (National Crime Authority Act 1984, 55. 52—55). There have been
disputes in the past over what the committee has alleged has been the
Authority’s reluctance to disclose material to the committee, but that dispute
has apparently been amicably resolved. It is to be hoped that in the changes
which will remove the Authority’s “sunset clause” there will be no reduction
in the level of Parliamentary oversight of the Authority. There is also the
oversight of an Inter-Governmental Committee.
In contrast the N.S.W. State Drug Crime Commission operates with little
if any oversight of any kind:
1. there is no Parliamentary oversight committee;
2. there is no strong external body such as the N.C.A.’s
Intergovernmental Committee; and
3. the S.D.C.C. lacks any real public interest input in that its
management committee consists of the Police Minister, the Police
Commissioner, a delegate of the N.C.A. and the Chairman of the
State Drug Crime Commission himself.
Even the Police Board, for example, has some outside persons on it, but
not the SD.C.C. management committee. Nor is the S.DC. C. directly
responsible to Parliament.
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is now subject to a
Parliamentary oversight committee established in 1986, but that has only
limited powers of inquiry (can only investigate matters referred to it by the
Minister or Parliament, ASIO Act, 5. 92C) and reporting (ASIO Act, 5. 92N). The
position of Inspector General has also been created to inquire into ASIO’s
compliance with the law, its general operations and complaints by the public.
However it is limited in that reports on transgressions can only be made to
Ministers and not to the Parliament or the public (Inspector General of
Intelligence and Security Act 1986, ss. 8, 10). Thus neither the Parliamentary
committee nor the Inspector. General may be in a position to inform the
Parliament or the public about ASIO breaches of the electronic surveillance
laws.
 
 49
Of even greater concern is the extension of phone tap powers to that
section of the State police forces over which there is no public or Parliamentary
oversight—the State Special Branches, the State counterparts of A810. These
political police have a proven track record of improper»and excessive use of
surveillance, both in N.S.W.24 and South Australia.25 They are subject neither
to Parliamentary oversight, mention in the annual reports of the police
commissioners, a legislative charter or the oversight of the Inspector General
of Intelligence and Security. Because these bodies operate secretly it is unlikely
that breaches of the law by them would be discovered. Even if they were that
would not be likley to lead to the revocation of the telephone tap power of the
police force of that particular state under the powers possessed by the federal
Minister under s. 37 (2) of the 1987 amendments for unsatisfactory compliance
with the law. That power is in effect a stick that will never be used once the
power has been, granted.
The right to individual civil damages remedies
The 1986 Parliamentary committee report made no reference to whether
there should be a right to damages for illegal phone tapping. The then Attorney
general Mr Landa raised the issue of civil damages in his Second Reading
Speech on the Listening Devices Act 1984, but the issue was never heard of
again.
Although few people who are the subject of illegal electronic surveillance
arevin a position to know about it, obtain proof and proceed to sue for civil
damages, the right to a private civil action is an important protection when
there is political regulation of the conduct of criminal prosecutions under the
State Listening Devices Act (5. 28, requiring the Consent of the Attorney General)
and the 1987 federal amendments (s. 105, where prosecutions may only proceed
in the summary jurisdiction if the Attorney General or the Director of Public
Prosecutions bring the proceedings).
Mr Davies, for example, must have obtained permission to commence
his private information under the Listening Devices Act against the Willesee
television show. However, those criminal proceedings only resulted in ﬁnes
against the television company and an employee. The victim of the illegal
surveillance can get no accompanying damages for his loss of privacy and the
impact on his ﬁnancial situation, he only has the remedy of proceedings in the
defamation jurisdiction. Nor could Mr Peacock obtain damages following his
removal from the Opposition front bench after the illegal publication of illegally
obtained transcripts of his telephone conversations with Mr Kennett.
This Australian position contrasts with the availability of damages or
compensation overseas ﬂowing from a breach of phone tap laws, including:
1. United States
Where there is a breach of the law an aggrieved person has
a right of action and may recover:
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed
at the rate of $100 per day for each violation or $1,000,
whichever is higher;
2“ N.S.W. Privacy Committee. N.S. W. Special Branch (1978, Report 45.)
25 South Australia. Special Branch Security Records: Initial Report to the Hon. D. Dunstan by
the Hon. Mr Acting Justice White, 1978.
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(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred (18 USC 2520).
2. Canada
A court may order punitive damages of up to $5,000
following conviction of an accused for breaches of the phone tap
law (Canada. Criminal Code 5. 178.21).
3. Britain
A special Tribunal may direct the Secretary of State to pay
an applicant a speciﬁed amount of money by way of compensation
following a ﬁnding that the Act has been contravened. (U.K.
Interception of Communications Act 1985, s. 7 (5) (c)).
Individual and class action proceedings in the US. against federal and
state law enforcement agencies for breaches of privacy rights and illegal
surveillance have resulted in a range of damages awards and orders, including
requiring citizen participation in the review of agency policies.26 Recently, for
example, the US. Socialist Workers Party recovered $264,000 in damages for
breaches of privacy committed by the FBI.27 '
Exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence
At present, the decision whether to admit evidence obtained in breach
of the federal phone tap law is a matter of common law discretion (Hilton v.
Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57).
In N.S.W. under the Listening Devices Act 5. 13 (d) illegally obtained
listening device material is admissible in prosecutions involving offences
punishable by penal servitude for life or 20 years or more, and also in
proceedings relating to serious narcotics offences.
The 1987 federal phone tap amendments exclude the use of illegally
obtained evidence except to establish a contravention of the
Telecommunications (Interception) Act. The delay in the proclamation and
commencement of the 1987 amendments is reputed to be caused by a wish by
the federal government to have reinstated into the Act clause 64 which was
removed by the Senate. That clause was known variously as the “Howard
Hilton” or “Edelsten” amendment and would have permitted the use of
illegally-obtained phone tap material in any proceedings commenced before the
Act is proclaimed.
In Canada, illegally obtained phone tap material is inadmissible in
evidence unless the error arises out of a defect of form or procedure (5. 178. 16
(2))-
In the United States, communications obtained in violation of the
wiretap law may not be received as evidence in trials or proceedings (18 USC
2515). As in Canada, there are exceptions for material obtained in “good faith”.
1" Schurr, B. ‘Scrutinising State Snoopers’ in Zdenkowski (Ed) The Criminal Injustice System.
vol. 2 (Sydney, Pluto Press, 1987): 56.
27 “FBI ﬁned $264,000 for planting moles in socialist party” Sydney Morning Herald, 27.8.86.
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The importance of the exclusionary rule in controlling illegal state
surveillance and searches in the US has been described as paramount:
Other remedies have been worthless or futile. To do otherwise
(thansuppress) is to grant the right but in reality to -withhold its
privileges and enjoyment. (Mapp v. Ohio, 307 US 643 (1961)
Other remedies have completely failed to secure
compliance . . . on the part of police ofﬁcers . . . Experience has
demonstrated however that neither administrative, criminal nor civil
remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.
(People v. Cahan, 44 Cal 2d. 434 (1955); 282 P 2d. 905)
The 1987 Australian exclusionary rule is a step forward, but in our
federal system there must be uniformity to exclude illegally obtained electronic
surveillance material. The US. experience shows that without uniformity there
is disruptive forum shopping:
Once evidence, inadmissible in a federal court is admissible
in a state court, a “double standard” exists which, as the court points
out, leads to “working arrangements” that undercut federal policy and
reduce some aspects of law enforcement to a shabby business. (Mapp
v. Ohio, 307 US 643 (1961))
Without a uniform exclusionary rule we will have more “borderline”
cases such as Edelsten ((1986) 7 NSWLR 222) and Oliver ((1985) 57 ALR 543),
borderline both in terms of the technology used and the jurisdiction sought.
Electronic surveillance—no longer an exceptional power
In 1979 phone tap powers were justiﬁed as being a limited exception to
the right to privacy and as being directed at the alleged one great threat to the
fabric of Australian life—the international drug trade. All over the world, many
great expansions to police powers have been made in the name of the “war
against drugs”,28 although the catch-cry of ﬁghting “organised crime”29 is more
popular at present and underpins the 1987 amendments.
The 1987 amendments do not include a schedule setting out the relevant
offences for which tapping may be undertaken by naming the Acts and sections.
This contrasts with legislation in Canada (5. 178.1) and the US. (18 USC 2516).
Once the amendments are proclaimed, phone taps will be obtainable on
suspicion of any state or federal offence which carries a penalty of 7 or more
years imprisonment and which involves some form of violence or fraud or is
drug related. An overwhelming proportion of indictable offences in N.S.W.
would qualify.
’8 Wisotsky Exposing the War on Cocaine. The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition’
(1983) 6 Wisconsin Law Review 1306.
29 Wardlaw, G. Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement‘ Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. No. 67, the
Control ofOrganized Crime. March 1986 pp. 17—34.
#__+___J
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The US. and Canadian experience shows that phone taps are rarely used‘
in relation to serious offences such as murder and kidnapping. They are mostly
used in relation to behavioural offences (gambling and drugs) and inchoate
offences (conspiracies and attempts). In the period 1969 to 1973 in the US. for
example, there were no phone tap warrants issued in relation to murd
er,
kidnapping or assault but there were 2 256 relating to gambling and 496 relating
to drugs.30 In Canada in 1985 two warrants were issued relating to murder
and
none relating to kidnapping but inchoate offences were cited 583 times ,
(including conspiracy, incitement and attempts)“ While a large number related
to drug offences, including eighty-seven for amphetamines and ninety-one for
i LSD, three were issued for the unlicensed distillation of liquor
and three were
for national security offences.
' Phone tap material is not even good evidence:
Free conversation is often characterised by exaggerated
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods and the expression of anti-social
desires or views not intended to be taken seriously . . .
In speech that is overheard and recorded, all the off-hand
comments, sarcastic remarks, indiscretions, partial observations,
agreements with statements to draw out a' partner in conversation or
to avoid an argument and many similar aspects of informal private
intercourse are capable of being “turned on” by another for his own
purpose.32
The most effective strategy to try to redress the imbalance of the
expansion of police powers to conduct electronic surveillance would be to
procure the enactment of state and federal legally enforceable rights to privac
y.
3" see footnote 23 above.
3' see footnote 16 above.
’3 Elliott. ‘Listening Devices and the Participant Monitor: Controlling the Use of Electronic
Surveillance in Law Enforcement‘. (1982) 6 Cri/n L J 327.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Beverley Schurr
After I ﬁnished this paper earlier this week I received some rather bad news.
The ﬁrst was that the annual reports on the use of Listening Devices had been
presented for 1985 and 1986 although they were not available through the
Government Printing Ofﬁce.
The second piece of bad news came when I opened up these reports and
saw the extent to which listening devices warrants had been issued in New South
Wales. In 1985 there were 107 warrants issued, and in 1986 there were 207
warrants issued. So, in 1986 ﬁgures there were four warrants a week being
issued. The ﬁgures also show some other problems in the regulation of electronic
surveillance, in that all of the applications for warrants were granted. You will
see in my paper that the overseas experience is that nearly all warrants are
granted. In the US. in 1984 only one out of 800 warrants was rejected and in
Canada in 1985 all the 591 warrant applications were granted. So it seems that
the listening device warrant ﬁgures reﬂect what happens in phone tapping.
The New South Wales Annual Reports also show some problems in
regulating illegal surveillance in that in 1985 only three prosecutions were
launched against illegal bugs, and in 1986 there were no prosecutions launched
at all.
In my paper I have looked at some of the protections that exist overseas.
We are now in the position in Australia that the number and the kinds of
oﬂences for which police can tap has been expanded enormously in the 1987
amendments to the Telecommunications (Interception) Act. We are almost on a
par with North American police who have extensive phone tapping powers.
Unfortunately we have not been carried along by the second wave in that we
have not been given all the extensive protections and procedural limitations that
citizens in North America have in order to protect their right to privacy against
unlawful surveillance. It is unfortunate that while the Mounties and the F.B.I,
can cope with greater regulations our police forces have somehow won the day
and Parliament has not given us the sorts of rights that we might have if we
were citizens in Canada and the United States.
I have attempted to assess how much phone tapping and electronic
surveillance is going on in Australia. The 1987 Federal amendments will
produce in time a detailed statistical Annual Report. However, that report will
leave out some of the more politically and personally sensitive material such as
the number of people intercepted, the number of conversations recorded, the
cost per warrant, and the number of national security phone taps put in place.
There are only two pieces of published statistics about phone tapping
in Australia. One was the answer to a question on notice in the House of
Representative in 1973 which set out 8 years of statistics on ASIO phone tap
warrants. In my paper I have averaged those ﬁgures out to ninety-one a year.
The other ﬁgures are of an unpublished submission by the Australian Federal
Police to the 1986 Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into this area. That
calculates the number of warrants issued over a 17 month period as being 1 l7
warrants, the average duration was 64 days, and the total period of surveillance
was 7 500 days. Oﬂicial United States statistics on the number of people whose
conversations are intercepted and the number of conversations that are
intercepted under each warrant can be applied to the total of about 175 A810
and Federal Police warrants per year. My conclusion is that about 8 000
Australians have their conversations intercepted each year and over 100 000
conversations are recorded each year in Australia. That conclusion cannot ever
be conﬁrmed because the Australian Annual Report will not include ﬁgures
which show how many Australians have been affected.
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Nor will the Annual Reports disclose how much phone tapping is
costing. We will not be able to assess the cost beneﬁt of phone tapping in various
police operations because, unlike the US, the police will not be required, none
of the agencies will be required, to assess the cost per warrant. However, the
1986 Federal Police submission estimated that each interception or tap cost
$75,000. That may be justiﬁable perhaps in cases involving billion dollar
imports of drugs into Australia. It may not be justiﬁed in cases where warrants
were obtained in relation to offences with a penalty of 7 years or more, offences
such as break and enter into individual houses and serious stealing offences. In
such cases the cost of $75,000 per warrant simply may not be justiﬁable. The
police should instead consider following the money trails of serious organised
crime offences as Mr Costigan has repeatedly suggested.
On my way here tonight I was trying to think of a few phone tapping
jokes but there aren’t really any. There was a real life story in Canada in the
case of Davies. The Canadian law required a warrant for the tapping of
conversations between two persons. Mr Davies was arrested by the police on
suspicion and put into a Canadian police interview room which apparently was
bugged and had a one way mirror. Left to his own devices in that room he got
off the chair and knelt down beside it in a praying position and said “Dear God,
let me get away with it just this once”. There was then several years of litigation
as to whether or not God was a person under Canadian law. There was another
story arising out of the Stewart Royal Commission Report. One person knew
they were being tapped by police in a nearby ﬂat on the same ﬂoor of the
apartment building. So the person under surveillance made lots of phone calls
to various people telling them that there was going to be a big gambling night
on such and such a night. That information was apparently duly passed on to
the Gaming Squad by the police phone tappers. Shortly before the alleged
gambling night was due to start the person under surveillance changed the
numbers on his own and the police ofﬁcers’ ﬂat doors. The Gaming Squad
consequently raided the police oﬂicers’ ﬂat.
The main thrust of my paper is that we should have a right to privacy
in Australia. The English have it. Their law has to meet the standard set in the
European Convention on Human Rights. Canadians have it. Their laws are
subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The United States
has various privacy protections in their Bill of Rights.
We cannot have these rights unless we have proper remedies and the
paucity of civil remedies is explained in my paper (page 49) as is the problem
of political regulation of private prosecutions. If the police or the D.P.P. decide
not to proceed in a matter involving phone tapping the matter does not proceed
past the magistrate’s courts. If you wish to launch a prosecution under the
Listening Devices Act in New South Wales you must have the Attorney General’s
permission. It may be granted, as for example in the prosecution of the Willesee
programme. In the United States they have been much more creative although
the cases there drag on for years. One of the journalists tapped, he says
improperly, by the Nixon White House and by Dr Kissenger has a case that
has not yet proceeded to hearing. He is claiming damages under the American
phone tap law. In Australia, Mr Peacock suffered ﬁnancial loss and damage to
his reputation following the publication of illegal phone tap material. He does
not have a remedy in civil damages. Nor does the man who was the subject of
the Willesee programme. He is proceeding in the defamation jurisdiction but
he has no right to damages ﬂowing from the breach of his privacy.
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There is simply not enough public scrutiny of how the phone tap system
is going to operate. The Federal and State Ombudsmen will be‘authorised to
oversight the way the police use these powers but they will not be able to report
publicly. They can only report to the responsible Minister. Further, a number
of the bodies that will have a power to tap, in particular I am thinking of the
State Drug Crime Commission and the Special Branch of the New South Wales
police, simply do not have adequate public scrutiny of their activities. We have
seen in the 1978 White and Privacy Committee Reports that the New South
Wales and South Australian Special Branches conducted surveillance on all
manner of people, particiularlythe Council for Civil Liberties and the Labor
Party, but there were no records found of any surveillance of members of the
Liberal Party. We have a great history of the improper exercise of surveillance
powers. There is still no Annual Report by the Special Branches to Parliament
so that we can see what they are doing.
Amongst the criticisms of the State Drug Crime Commission is, that
unlike the National Crime Authority, there is no Parliamentary oversight
committee, nor is there a strong external oversight committee. The State Drug
Crime Commission oversight committee consists of the Minister for Police, the
Commissioner of Police, the Head of the State Drug Crime Commission itself,
and someone from the National Crime Authority. his a committee with no
outside representation. While there is a requiremnent for a State Drug Crime
Commission Annual Report, I think readers of the ASIO’s Annual Report will
not have much expectation of the State Drug Crime Commission’s Annual
Report revealing anything.
In summary my paper reviews the sorts of protections that are in place,
and finds them wanting.
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REFORMING TELEPHONE INTERCEPTION LAWS
THE REPORT OF THEVJOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Tim Game, Barrister-at-Law.
Jim Nolan, Barrister-at-Law.
Introduction
The competing issues, interests and problems associated with telephone
interception laws have displayed some interesting parallels in the western
democracies. ' ‘
In evidence to a US. Congressional Committee in the thirties, a young
ofﬁcer of the Federal Bureau of Investigations indignantly told the Committee
that the FBI would not be so unethical as to tap telephone calls. The ofﬁcer’s
name was J. Edgar Hoover. Although the activities of the FBI in surveillance
of crime, and in the ﬁftiespolitical activities of suspected communists, is
notorious, the application of telephone surveillance legislation was far from
certain in that country until as recently as the sixties. A recent report by the
Congressional Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment explains that'it was not until
the enactment of Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act
in 1968 that a relatively .certain regime of telephone interception was
established.I Before that, the Communications Act (1934)«as interpreted by the
US. Supreme Court in the 1938 decision in Nardone v. United States 302 US.
379 had the effect of prohibiting all telephone wiretapping even when performed
by Federal Ofﬁcers.
Perhaps it comes as no shock to Australians to learn that
notwithstanding this decision and a number of failed attempts by the Congress
to enact interception laws between 1938 and 1968, the US. Justice Department
continued to authorise wiretapping by relying on its own self-serving
interpretation of Nardone.
In the United Kingdom, the issue of telephone tapping was similarly,
not well deﬁned by the law. In-the recent (1979) case of Malone v. Metropolitan
Police Commissioner2 the central issue was not so much whether and in what
circumstances telephone tapping was permitted but whether it was prohibited
at all. In the course of his long and interesting judgment, Sir Robert
Megarry V.C. observed “if the tapping of telephones by the post ofﬁce can be
carried out without any breach of the law, it does not require any statutory or
common law power to justify it: it can be lawfully done simply because there
is nothing to make it unlawful.”3 Telephone tapping had been carried out in
the United Kingdom under an administrative agreement between the post ofﬁce
and the Home Secretary until 1969 when section 80 of the Post Oﬁice Act 1969
' Federal Government Information Technology: Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties
(ggghingtgn. DC: US. Congress. Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment, OTA-CIT-293. October
I p. .
3 Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] I Ch 344. for a discussion of Malone, its
progress to the European Commission on Human Rights and subsequent developments. see
Ian J. Lloyd ‘The Interception of Communications Act (1985)” (1986) 49 Mod. LR 86. see also
Case Note (1980) 43 Mod. LR 59.
3 Malone p. 367.
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(UK) gave statutory recognition to this pre-existing arrangement albeit in
cryptic terms.4 The law remained sufﬁciently unclear for the European Court
of Human Rights to ﬁnd that it failed to carry into the law of the UK. the
relevant protections of the European Convention on Human Rights.5
This decision, and the fact that British Telecom was to be privatised
with the attendant embarrassment that in future a private corporation Would
be undertaking secret surveillance unregulated by law, led to the enactment of
the Interception of Communications Act (1985) UK.
In Canada too, the issue of secret surveillance of political dissenterse
including by unauthorised “wiretaps”-—-—created acute embarrassment and led
to a Commission of Inquiry and substantial changes in the law.6
Similar problems troubled law enforcement agencies in this country. In
our case however, there were no ambiguities or difﬁculties in application of the
law—it was simply disregarded]
Telephone interception laws were ﬁrst enacted in Australia in 1960 in
the form of the Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act (1960) which
dealt principally with ASIO interception. The act was repealed and replaced by
the present Telecommunications Interception Act (1979). This act allowed
ofﬁcers of the Customs service to intercept telephone services for narcotics
offences under the Customs Act upon the obtaining of a warrant from a judge.
Following the revelation of the material which came to be known as the
“Age Tapes”, the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victorian governments
established the Stewart Royal Commission.8 The Royal Commissioner was
invited to make any recommendations he saw as desirable in the light of his
inquiry. At its conclusion he made a number of recommendations including the
extension of telephone tapping powers and functions to state police—not
necessarily utilising Telecom—and the extension of the offences, in the
investigations of which telephone interceptions could be employed.
The Joint Select Committee on Telecommunication Interception
As a result of the Stewart Commission Report, the government
introduced the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill (1986). The
bill proposed to pick up the recommendations to extend telephone, tapping
powers to the states. No doubt because of the political sensitivity of this
proposal in the light of the Age tapes controversy, the bill was referred to a
Parliamentary Joint Select Committee.
The Committee consisted of seven members drawn from all parties and
both houses.9 Its ﬁrst sitting was on 17th July, 1986 and its last on 18th
‘ Malone pp. 369—71.
5 (I985) 7 EHRR l4.
5 Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the RCMP, various reports, see note
(1985) 48 Mod. LR 201.
7 See Schurr B. p. 41.
8 The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Telephone Interceptions. This‘ inquiry into the
“Age tapes” took 49 days, examined [73 witnesses and took 3 984 pages of transcript.
9 Mr S. P. Martin, M.P., Chairman, Mr P. M. Ruddock, M.P., Deputy Chairman, and Senators
Archer, Black, Cooney and Vigor, and M.P.’s Hon. P. Duncan, Lee and McGauran.
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November, 1986. It received forty-four written submissions, thirty-one exhibits,
and heard oral evidence from thirty-seven persons. In view of the substantial
reason for the proposed amendments to telephone interception laws of the
Commonwealth, it was remarkable that virtually none of the state governments
treated the Committee seriously enough to make proper, or in some cases any,
submission to it. This moved the Committee to comment in its report:
The Committee was ,surprised at the response of State
Governments to invitations to contribute to the Committees inquiry.
Their responses are detailed in the report, and can best be described
as less than enthusiastic, particularly when the main issue before the
Committee involved a signiﬁcant potential devolution of
Commonwealth power to the states.lo
A number of valuable observations and disclosures are made in the
Report of the Joint Select Committee on Telecommunication Interception.ll
(J.S.C. report). First, the A.F.P. told the Committee that the capacity it
possessed to monitor telephones was limited by its equipment to thirty-eight
telephones and that stafﬁng and ﬁnancial constraints had effectively reduced this
to ﬁfteen telephones. Secondly, there is valuable material on the mechanics of
monitoring and the processes of internal review adopted by the Australian
Federal Police. A
Principal Recommendations
The Committee made nine principal conclusions recommendations to
the Parliament. They included:l2
0 that the Telecommunications (Amendment) Interception Bill 1986
was confusing, its scope ill deﬁned, it lacked adequate safeguards
and was out of date having regard to existing and emerging
interception technologies; the bill should be withdrawn, re-written
and consolidated;
O that the case had not been made out to justify the extension of state
powers and powers of the N.C.A. to include telephone interception.
That the right to privacy and protection from illegal interception
and the malicious use of intercepted material are best preserved by
restricting the powers to intercept to a minimum. That while the
legal right to target interceptions should be decentralised and
extended interceptions should be carried out by a single agency
centralised in Telecom;
0 that the extension of intercept powers to cover serious offences be
restricted to murder, kidnapping, organised crime activities and
serious drug trafﬁcking;
Othat illegal tapping be curtailed by the use of one interception
agency and the restriction of availability of devices used solely for
telecommunications interception by declaring them prohibited
imports subject to licenses for law enforcement purposes only and
banning their sale, possession, installation and use. Telecom should
0 Report of the Joint Select Committee on Telecommunication Interception (“J.S.C." report),
AGPS Canberra, November 1986.
" J.S.C. Report. p. v.
1 J.S.C. Report. pp. ix—xvi.
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pursue the maintenance of the integrity of its network;
0 safeguards necessary in any new bill ought to include a restriction
on the life span of interception warrants to ninety days, detailed pre-
requisites for the issue of warrants including satisfying a judge to
whom an application is made that all alternative investigative
techniques have been exhausted or would be inappropriate;
0 the uniform listening devices legislation be encouraged among the
state governments by the Commonwealth;
O that communication of any legally intercepted material otherwise
than for the purposes of the warrant be prohibited unless it relates
to an offence which attracts 3 years imprisonment or longer. Also
recommended were stringent penalties for the misuse of legally
obtained information, and independent oversight by reporting and
Judicial audit.
The 1987 Amendment Act
The government’s 1987 proposals for reform of the Commonwealth
interception laws failed to pass one important requirement recommended by
the J.SC—the reforms were brought forward by the government in the form
of further amendments to the 1979 Act and not new consolidated legislation
which the Committee saw as indispensable Far from clarifying the confusions
and complexities of the old statute the new amendments build on those
complexities.
The 1987 amendments include:
Othe range of offences to which the act applies is extended from
narcotics offences as deﬁned by s. 235 of the Customs Act (1901)
Commonwealth to a range of offences categorised in 2 classes
including: ,
Class 1 oﬂences—include murder, kidnapping and “narcotics
offences”,
Class 2 offences—include offences involving loss of life or risk of
serious injury and offences to property in circumstances endangering
personal safety; trafﬁcking in narcotics drugs, serious fraud or
serious loss to the revenue of the Commonwealth or a state.
0 Circumstances relating to the issue of warrants for the two classes
of offence are distinguished only by the fact that in determining
whether or not to grant a warrant in relation to a class 2 offence, a
judge must, in addition to certain formal requirements, consider the
ir'npact- of the interception on the privacy of any-person likely to be ‘
effected by the interception together with the gravity of the conduct
alleged to constitute the offence (s. 45 and 46)
OOffences in both classes include federal and state offences and
warrants may be sought by officers of federal and state authorities
on application to a judge (s. 39).'3 Although the warrants can be
obtained by state and federal agencies” without restriction they are
to be executed by the Telecommunications Interceptions Division
of the Australian Federal Police (5. 32 and 55).
'3 S. 60 gives the power to the Attorney-General to prescribe persons as eligiblejudges.
'4 These agencies are the A.F.P., any State police force, the N.S.W. Drug Crime Commission,
the Fitzgerald Commission, and may be extended to cover other state authorities by declaration
by the Commonwealth Attorney General.
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OSubstantial limitations on the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence are set out in Part 7 which creates a general exclusion
except where a minor irregularity has occurred in connection with
the issue of a warrant,(s. 75).
0 Section 7, reproduces the basic offence of illegal interception whilst
63 deals with the use of lawfully obtained information otherwise
than for purposes of the Act. Section 105 creates indictable offences
for these. The proceedings must be brought in the name of the
Commonwealth Attorney or the D.P.P.‘5 If follows that private
individuals could not bring proceedings against an agency which has
been guilty of illegal interceptions.
Offences
The most important feature of the amended Act is the extension of the
categories of offences from those set out in the 1979 Act—viz. “narcotics
offences” as deﬁned in s. 235 of the Customs Act to the two classes of offences
created by the amended Act.
One of the major criticisms of the 1979 Act and the 1986 bill centered
on the reference to “narcotics offence” in the Customs Act (1901). Such offences
in that Act ranged from the most serious offences involving trafficking of large
quantities of heroin to trivial offences involving small quantities of minor
narcotics. For example, cannabis is deemed to be a narcotic under the Act.'6
In the amended Act there is no definition of a “narcotics offence”. More
disturbing however, “narcotics offence” is included in the deﬁnition of class 1
offences, the more serious of the two classes of offence. In the issuing of a
warrant in respect of class 1 offences considerations of personal privacy and
the relative gravity of the offence are issues which may not be taken into account
by the issuing judge (s. 45). This is in a stark contrast with the offence
“trafﬁcking in narcotic drugs” which is a class 2 offence and in relation to which
a judge is entitled to consider issues of personal privacy and the gravity of the
offence.'7
A further issue in relation to class 1 offences is the use of the definitions
of murder and kidnapping, the words of extension “or an offence of a kind
equivalent to” (murder or kidnapping). A number of state kidnapping laws
define the offence so as to extend widely the concept of kidnapping.
Class 2 offences include ‘serious personal injury, property damage
involving the risks of personal injury, serious offences involving dishonesty and
federal and state revenue offences so long as all the offences are punishable by
imprisonment for a period of at least 7 years and are regarded by the judge
granting the warrant as serious. As noted above, the offence “trafﬁcking in
narcotic drugs” is included in this class of offence.
'5 Note the D.P.P. Act section.
'6 Customs Act (I90l) s. 4. and column I of schedule 6.
'7 Notwithstanding the fact that the gravity of the offence could hardly be relevant in the case
of drug trafficking.
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Warrants
Warrants may be applied for by a member of any of the state, territory
or federal police, or a member of any prescribed state authority.‘8 An afﬁdavit
must accompany any application and include particulars as to the facts and
grounds on which it is based, the period for which the warrant is required and
the justiﬁcation for the period so requested, any previous applications and
warrants issued and their use. The judge to whom the application is made may
require the production of further information.
Although there is no discretion to exclude illegally or improperly
obtained evidence in civil proceedings,” the Act provides by s. 77 that evidence
obtained by way of interception whether legally or illegally obtained shall not
be used otherwise than in accordance with the act and “proceedings” are so
deﬁned as to include civil proceedings thus rendering illegally obtained evidence
inadmissible. '
Offences against the Act
Sections 105—107 prescribe offences for the contravention of sections 7
and 63—those sections relating to the communication of both legally and
illegally obtained material.
Ci'vil remedies
It isclear that no civil remedy is established by the Act. Accordingly it
is necessary to look to the common law principles, if any, which apply to an
invasion of privacy such as is brought about by illegal telephone interception
or alternatively, the use or disclosure of information, the product of a legal
interception, where that use or disclosure is not authorised by the Act.
The most obvious remedy is trespass to property. However only in
circumstances involving the placement of “bugs” on the target’s property, will
this remedy have utility.20 The relevant legislation here may include the various
state Listening Devices Acts and s. 219A et seq. of the Customs Act. Of the other
likely candidates to provide a remedy against interception are the torts of breach
of conﬁdence, and action on the case in nuisance.
Breach of Conﬁdence
The possibility of a remedy for breach of conﬁdence was acknowledged
in the decision of the\ Court of Appeal in Francombe v. Mirror Group
Newspapers Ltd.“ In that case an injunction was sought to prevent the
impending use by the Mirror newspaper of illegally procured tapes of telephone
conversations by the plaintiff, a well known jockey. Breaches of the rules of
racing were apparently the subject of the conversations.
'5 Emergency telephone warrants may be obtained in certain circumstances, Pan V, by authorised
persons, 5. 40 (20) and (3), 43.
'9 There is a trend away from this.
2° Although it would be possible for an infringement of this Act to involve a trespass the
technology makes any physical trespass unnecessary.
2' Francombe v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] l W.L.R. 892.
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In granting an injunction to prevent publication, the Court of Appeal
held that a breach of conﬁdence in the plaintiff’s telephone calls had occurred.
In answer to the submission that Malone negatived the existence of any right
to conﬁdentiality in the circumstances of Francombe, Lord Justice Fox said:
Illegal tapping by private persons is quite another matter since
it must be questionable whether the user of a telephone can be
regarded as accepting the risk of that in the same way as, for example,
he accepts the risk that his conversation may be overheard in
consequence of the accidents and imperfections of the telephone
system itself“, 23
Nuisance
In cases in which no action in breach of conﬁdence lies, or as an
alternative to breach of conﬁdence, the tort most likely to have any application
is nuisance. In Australia it is thought that the High Court decision in Victoria
Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd. Club v. Taylor and Others”
stands as authority that surveillance is not an actionable nuisance. In that case
one of the respondent’s, radio station 2UW, had built a platform on Taylor’s
land Overlooking the appellant’s race course. The case involved in essence, the
taking of a commercial advantage by the use of a platform to broadcast
commentaries of the appellant’s races without payment. In that case no question
of breach of conﬁdence could have arisen as none could be expected.
Accordingly, the only arguableremedy was in nuisance.
The majority rejected the appellant’s contention that such a cause of
action existed upon the basis that the respondents had not interfered in any
way with the use and enjoyment of the appellant’s land but had merely made
the business carried on by the plaintiff less proﬁtable. However, even Latham
C. J. recognized that as the categories of nuisance were not closed, then if some
new method of interfering with the comfort of persons in the use of land
emerges the law may provide a remedy and he cited the increasing use of
electricity with the possibility of the escape of electricity into adjoining property
as providing a new possible source of interference with enjoyment of land.25
Furthermore, of the ﬁve’ members of the Court, Rich J. and Evatt J.
delivered persuasive dissenting judgments. Rich J. observed that the categories
of nuisance were not foreclosed26 and continued:
What appears to me to be the point in this case is that the right
of view or observation from adjacent land has never been held to be
an absolute and complete right of property incident to the occupation
of that land”.
12 Francombe p. 900.
23 Clayton and Tomlinson however raise the important point that it is only the parties to the
conversation which in the traditional formulation of breach of conﬁdence have an obligation
of conﬁdence viz. the action is based on the relationship of conﬁdence. Clayton R. and
Tomlinson H. Civil Actions Against the Police. Sweet and Maxwell (1987) London p. 278.
2‘ Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd Club v. Taylor and others (1937) 58
CLR 479.
25 p. 493.
2" p. 500.
27 p. 504.
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Indeed the'prospects of television make our present decision
a very important one, and I venture to think that the advance of that
art may force the courts to recognise that protection against the
complete exposure of the doings of the individual may be a right
indispensable to the enjoyment of life.28
Evatt J in a similarly forthright dissent, after reviewing law
relating to actionable nuisance, set out the following propositions:
(a) Although there is no general right of privacy recognised
by the common law neither is there an absolute and
unrestricted right to spy on or to overlook the property
of another person.
(b) A person who creates or uses devices for the purpose of
enabling the public generally to overlook or spy upon the
premises of another person will generally become liable
to an action in nuisance providing appreciable damage,
discomfort or annoyance is caused.
(c) As in all cases of private nuisance all the surrounding
circumstances will require examination.
(d) The fact that in such cases the defendant’s conduct is
openly pursued or that his motive is merely thatof proﬁt
making or that he makes no direct charge will provide no
answer to an action.29 .
Although Evatt J. was of the view that the utility of the defendant’s
conduct provided no defence, the converse is clearly not the case if the conduct
of the defendant was carried out for some plainly antisocial or» illegal purpose
or consisted of and illegal act then that would be a matter of great relevance in
determining whether or not the tort had been made out.
The present High Court has demonstrated a preparedness to review
previous decisions where the reasons for those decisions are not persuasive. The
Victoria Park Racing Club Case, it is submitted, is such a case. In any event, it
involved the right to take a commercial advantage whereas telephone tapping
cases will involve a very different balancing of interests.
Ironically the possibility of a civil remedy—as remote as it may seem
on the authorities—may be entirely precluded because of evidentiary
considerations. '
In its attempt to circumscribe the admissibility of illegally obtained
interception evidence the government appears to have also excluded the
admissibility of such evidence in any civil proceedings taken by a person who
suffered damage as a result of an illegal intercept.
Article 13 of the European Convention provides that effective remedies
must be a feature of domestic law of member states. Of course, to be in a
position to assert one’s rights one must have knowledge that they‘have been
violated. This is a rationale of the US. law which requires the target on
interception to be informed after the event except in special circumstances. As
a consequence of a decision of the German Constitutional Court, the German
33 p. 505.
2" p. 521.
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authorities likewise are obliged to inform interception targets as soon as possible
after the termination of‘the intercept consistent with safeguarding the purposes
of the interception. Civil remedies are available through the normal courts in
Germany.30 In Australia neither of the two safeguards, i.e., notiﬁcation or civil
damages is available.
“Pen Registers”
' A surveillance method taken up neither by the ISO nor the government
is the use of “pen registers”. This is the American name for a telephone
monitoring device used by telephone companies for routine billing purposes.
The device records the telephone number of every incoming and outgoing call
to a service. Such information is likely to be very useful in certain
circumstances. Because of the wording of the US. legislation, the Supreme
Court has held that pen registers are not protected by Title 111 because they
intercept only non-aural communications.31 In another case, this time relying
on the fourth amendment, the court held that there was no expectation to
privacy in the numbers dialled by a telephone subscriber who assumed the risk
that the telephone company might reveal all the numbers he dialled.32
Under the Australian legislation it is at least arguable that the numbers
dialled fall within the deﬁnition of “communication” which term is defined in
the Act as follows—communication “includes conversation, message and signal
and any part of the conversation, message or signal”. Section 7 of the Act
however, excludes from the blanket prohibition of interception, inter alia, “the
installation of any apparatus or equipment, used or intended for use in
connection with a telecommunication service or the operation or
maintainenance of a telecommunication service”. Since the ISDN system
(apparently) automatically records subscriber dialling information this
information would appear to be of a type excluded from the Act by this section.
Oversight
This question has been dealt with in some detail by another speaker.33
It may be useful however to consider the safeguards on telephone interception
adopted by the West Germans. A system of supervision by a parliamentary
(Bundestag) committee drawn from the major parliamentary groupings and a
- commission consisting of a person qualiﬁed to hold judical ofﬁce and two
assessors.
u " Lloyd op. cil.. p. 94.
3' see O.T.A. report 0.1). 61]., US. v. New York Telephone Co. (I977) 434 US. l59.
’ Smith v. Maryland(l979) 442 US 735.
33 see Schurr. op. cit.
u u
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COMMENTARY
Dr Jacqueline Morgan, MB, 8.8., MSc. Soc, LL.B.,
Executive Member, N.S.W. Privacy Committee
The N.S.W. Privacy Committee argues that electronic surveillance is one
of the most serious forms of privacy invasion and it is most appropriate that
the Committee is participating in this Seminar. ‘
Every speaker has acknowledged that electronic surveillance is a privacy
issue, the degree of . invasion depending on the various view points they
represent. Regardless of those minor differences I think all speakers recognise
that electronic surveillance is a privacy issue, and, because of its very nature,
not only affects those who are suspect, but also innocent people.
There are others in the community, however, who do not see that there
are privacy issues involved in electronic surveillance. When it was reported that
the N.S.W. Police were to have the power to apply to a Federal judge for a
warrant to tap phones of suspected offenders, the then police Minister was
quoted as saying:
The only people who have anything to fear from telephone
tapping are crooks.
This is the kind of argument used when the Federal government was
pushing for the introduction of the national identiﬁcation scheme. We heard it
repeatedly. Those who opposed the introduction of the so-called Australia card
were labelled as “sly, sleazy, tax cheats, friends of tax cheats, or as people who
had something to hide”.
That was not the case. There were many people with very strong views
about the threat to personal autonomy and the threat to privacy by the
introduction of such a program.
The Privacy Committee’s interest in electronic surveillance is not new.
Nor should it be. Our interest has been there ever since the Committee was
ﬁrst formed. We submitted a paper to the Joint Select Committee on
Telecommunication Interception. The Report of that Select Committee has been
referred to in this Seminar’s proceedings.
The research for our submission was conducted by Ms Penny Quarry,
and it is signiﬁcant that many of the Privacy Committee recommendations,
including those relating to warrants and the prohibition and the sale of devices,
have been included in the Joint Select Committee’s recommendations.
Unfortunately, not all of our recommendations were accepted, however,
acceptance of some of them does serve as an acknowledgement that there really
are seriously privacy issues involved.
In dealing with a privacy issue such as electronic surveillance it is
probably appropriate to explain how the Privacy Committee goes about its
business. First, we try to identify whether in fact there is a privacy issue. When
this is established, we then look to see if there is any justiﬁcation for whatever
activity is involved which may cause an invasion of privacy.
Privacy is not considered to be an absolute right—a right in a vacuum,
but a balanced right in society. So our role then is to. research the issues that
would justify or fail to justify the invasion of privacy. Therefore, we look at
not just the legal issues, but the social issues, or any other relevant matter.
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In terms of justiﬁcation for electronic surveillance, Mr G. Blewitt, from
the National Crime Authority, has said:
There is a growing belief in the community that the public
interest in the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension
of criminals outweighs the public interest in free and private
communications and the “right to be left alone”. (page 12)
I take exception to this statement. I do not think he has sufﬁciently
substantiated his comments. I think they are generalisations which are not
supported by the facts. We heard similar arguments in relation to the proposed
national ID card. Fortunately, I think the community’s real concerns were
heard, and at this present time we believe the government will not go ahead
with a national identification scheme.
The Privacy Committee hopes, however, that the proposed privacy
legislation which was linked to the ID proposal, and was promised, will now
go ahead. Although the debate was traumatic for the Committee, we hope there
will be some benefits for the community, and some good will come out of it
all.
. The kind of questions the Committee looks at in justifying its position
is:
Will electronic surveillance actually assist in reducing the
problem of crime?
Have all other methods of crime solving and prevention been
thoroughly investigated?
Should we be looking at other avenues of approach?
I-Iow realistic are the other avenues which might be suggested?
Is the problem so serious that we should be using electronic
surveillance?
In discussing justiﬁcation, there are several different kinds of criteria we
would look at, and they include:
oWhat is the level of incriminating evidence obtained from such
electronic surveillance? '
There are some studies suggesting the answer is as low as 16
per cent and this is so, particularly for crimes such as theft. The
highest incriminating evidence level—up to 80 per cent is in
gambling, and other personel behaviour issues.
Electronic surveillance is not considered to be a good
evidentiary tool. It is impractical as it has been reported that in a
period of one hundred warrants there may be as many as 12 000
people recorded. It is clear therefore that the incidence of
information relevant to a particular prosecution, or even a charge,
is grossly under-rated in terms of the number of people whose
privacy is invaded. '
0 Cost effectiveness, as mentioned by others at this Seminar, needs
to be looked at more critically. It is an area which should not be
dismissed. Other approaches to crime detection have not been fully
looked at.
There is also the issue of the paper chase. As noted in the
Costigan report, actual interceptions are not the best way of
following through.
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0 Community education on drug crimes for example, is minimal. This
kind of education, I believe, has very few resources allocated to it
and much work remains to be done.
In terms of actual telephone use, people will quickly discover
ways and means of communicating differently over the telephone,
thus rendering any legislation obsolete. Perhaps this is wishful
.thinking, but I do believe that people are resourceful enough to
overcome phone tappers.
Another justiﬁcation cited for electronic surveillance is that
Safeguards are built in to ensure accountability. In practice, we argue
that these safeguards are not being used as tightly as they should.
Audits and reports of surveillance are not readily available
If thereIS a requirement for reporting activity, then the results ought
to be readily available, and accessible.
0 In terms of the technology being used, again, the rate of
advancement is very rapid. Encryption devices for use by people
with phones already exist, and are becoming so sophisticated they
can be used even with cellular phones. A Chicago manufacturer who
has developed an expensive high tech encryption device for cellular
phones, recently informed me that the devices are so effective,
telephone tapping may be virtually redundant.
0 Visual surveillance has already been mentioned in these proceedings
and I am aware that import restrictions apply to many kinds of
visual surveillance pieces of equipment, particularly those used for
optical surveillance at night.
This kind of equipment is restricted to the Defence forces,
so there appears to be an attempt to control their use. The question
is—what becomes of that equipment once it is made obsolete by
the Defence authorities? It is supposed to be destroyed, but it is.
sometimes possible to discover them in secondhand dealers’ shops.
It is clear their use is meant to be limited, but in fact, the system
appears to be wide open to abuse.
Other surveillance devices will come onto the market, and
inevitably they will be more and more invasive. It has already been
accepted that lie detectors are not valid in the scientiﬁc evidence
they give, but more sophisticated physical devices will be developed.
It is clearly unrealistic to think that we already have reached the
ultimate in technology. If we do not suggest that this sort of
surveillance is not undertaken, it will be too late and we will have
no way of being protected from the new technology.
Finally, the absence of a right to privacy in Australia, or the absence of
privacy legislation in our society, is a gross omission. Mr Nolan mentioned in
his paper that there were virtually no civil remedies available. Innocent people
have no recourse to legal action.
Invasions of privacy by the use of electronic surveillance need to be
justiﬁed. The Privacy Committee has recommended detailed safeguards in its
submission, and it considers these to be minimal protections. But additionally
what is needed is a right to privacy through effective privacy legislation.
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DISCUSSION
Justin Coria
I have one very simple question. As far as delineation of the legislation
goes with the introduction of new legislation, is there a distinction made.
between the use of electronic and listening devices as evidence, as opposed to
simple matters of crime prevention or crime investigation? It says in the case
of the States where this kind of material can be used, say, in the case of video
listening devices, one can make the provision within law that this is possibly
the only way that one can, in fact, get a fix on certain criminal activities. Does
the new legislation here make that kind of provision? Perhaps there is a valid
use for such types of devices in the ﬁeld of legal preparation.
Phillip Bradley
The Telecommunication (Interception) Amendment Act depends upon an
application for a warrant based on the collection of evidence. The Interceptions
Act before the amendment had the same provision, and the Listening Devices
Act both Commonwealth and State are also directed at the collection of
evidence. That is not to say that, in the course of an imvestigation, there is a
great deal of material which is used "for the purposes of the investigation which
is not evidence and in many cases is unlikely to become evidence.
The'ASIO listening devices of course are for the protection of national
security and the requirement of collecting evidence is not part of the warrant
provisions.
Beverley Schurr
The one great advance in the 1987 amendments to the phone tap laws
is that any evidence that is not obtained lawfully under a warrant will be
excluded from admission in criminal proceedings. Previously it was admitted
on the judge’s discretion. Now the police have been given very much wider
powers because they said they needed that—“honest police” were breaking the
law in order to collect this evidence. Now the police have got these much
broader powers they are going to have to follow the rules. If they do not follow
the rules then any evidence they collect will be excluded from the courts and
they know that it will be excluded from the courts.
L. A. Fieldsend, Private Enquiry Agent
My question refers to Phillip Bradley’s paper, page 30:
The third main difference is that, except in the case of
application for a warrant by telephone, the applicant or complainant
need not be a policeman or oﬂicer of a particular law enforcement
agency.
What other people could easily apply under those circumstances?
 69
Phillip Bradley
The provision in the New South Wales Listening Device Act which deals
with applications for listening devices made over the telephone require a
policeman to make the application. So that if you ring up a judge and ask for
a warrant to use a listening device you must be a policeman. The section which
deals with listening devices warrants generally, that is, not obtained over the
telephone, do not mention policeman. It says “a person” may apply. On that
basis presumably a clerk Or a ﬁnancial analyst or somebody from the National
Crime Authority could go up to a judge and lay the complaint to base the
afﬁdavit for the warrant.
L. A. Fieldsend
But does that person have to be within an authority to make the
application for the warrant?
Phillip Bradley
It does not say that.
L. A. Fieldsend
As a private citizen could I go to a judge and ask for a warrant?
Phillip Bradley
You might inform a police ofﬁcer of some conduct which might justify
an application for a warrant. Then you might go along with the Solicitor from
the Director of Public Prosecutions in the State who makes the Chamber
application based on your complaint.
Chairman
If you go as a private citizen you might provide that very statistic that
Miss Schurr notes is absent, that is an unsuccessful application.
L. A. Fieldsend
Say that I have a client and a fraud is being committed in his company.
The police have investigated that fraud and have been unsuccessful. Could I
then make application with an affidavit and legal presentation for a warrant to
be able to listen within the company’s telephones? '
' Phillip Bradley
There is nothing in the Act to say you cannot. I doubt whether you
would get very far.
Chairman
That is a novel question so we will have to leave it up in the air. This
poses what is probably an unanswerable question in absolute terms. What price
is our society prepared to pay in point of encroachment upon personal freedoms
in pursuit of .our protection against crime? It is a balancing exercise. It is one
which probably is not capable of ultimate answer but I am sure it is one on
which opinions can vary widely from one end of the spectrum to the other.
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Professor Fisse in putting together this seminar sought to present
responsible views from each end of the spectrum. I do not say that we have
had extremist views, but we have had responsible views from each end.
Maccz'za Macpherson, Chairperson, National Organisation to Reform
Marihuana Laws
I understand that 12 000 persons would be listened to in the course of
some one hundred warrants. I would certainly like to get an answer as to
whether prosecutions would be taken against minor marijuana offenders
subsequent to information gained from such surveillance. In the case of a minor
marijuana dealer who may be being listened to who converses with numerous
friends in small time marijuana dealings, are each and every one of those
persons going to be charged or would no major charge be made against the
person listened to? Can that information be used by the police in prosecutions
against the other people who have bought marijuana?
Phillip Bradley
The position is this. It is extremely unlikely that anyone would get a
warrant to listen to and record the private conversations or the telephone
conversations of a minor marijuana dealer. The legislation contains speciﬁc
guidance for the judge in issuing the warrant and that sort of activity is not the
sort of'thing to which the legislation is directed. However, it is possible and it
happens, that warrants are obtained in relation to major drug investigations and
smaller ﬁsh are caught in the net. It is likely in those cases, if there is time and
resources available, that those smaller ﬁsh will be swept up and dealt with in
the ordinary course. But usually these electronic surveillance activities are
conducted by speciﬁc Task Forces which have speciﬁc targets which are not
usually bothered'with the peripheral activities of the people who associate with
the main targets. Does that answer the question? In other words, if the offence
is detected it is possible that they will be prosecuted but they are not likely to
be the target and they certainly would not be the subject of the warrant if the
level of activity is minor.
Dinah Van Dugteren, Capricorn Productions.
I am very concerned about civil liberties, but I have given a great deal
of thought about it and I think that in view of a lot of things that are happening
in society today it is absolutely essential that police are given more powers to
investigate organised crime, fraud, and a variety of other matters.
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I suppose I was worried when Miss Schurr, talking about cost beneﬁts
of electronic surveillance, said that it cost $75,000 per person—she was talking
about armed robbery in a home. What really makes me very angry indeed is
that the two women speakers have not mentioned the cost of human life. There
are armed hold-ups regularly. I am not a criminologist so I have not got statistics
but I did read the Mirror yesterday, and I am sure there are plenty of police at
this seminar who can conﬁrm some of these ﬁgures. “In the past 10 days police
reported more than forty armed hold-ups throughout the city”. These are not
necessarily stealing “grand-ma’s jewels”. We have a whole lot of small businesses
in Australia and large businesses which are trying to get our economy going.-
There was an armed hold-up in the Hilton Arcade a few weeks ago where some
enterprising small business people were there at 7 o’clock in the morning. One
of them was killed and the other man was terriﬁed his wife would be killed.
Ms Schurr and Ms Morgan do not seem to have mentioned that. In my opinion
one human life is worth at less ten or twenty surveillance actions just to make
sure that no one dies. We are talking about the reality of armed hold-ups which
are ever on the increase. This article also says that thieves are now concentrating
on small businesses, fast food shops, service stations, rather than homes and
big businesses because small businesses ﬁnd it very hard to pay the insurance.
Ms Morgan mentioned that electronic surveillance was not a very good
evidentiary tool. I thought that the recent operations of the National Crime
Authority such as Operation Silo, and Operation Lavender, proved conclusively
that these people would not have been apprehended had it not been for the use
of electronic surveillance. What else is available in Australia to try and track
down the money trail that Ms Morgan talks about? I would like to ask Mr
Blewitt and Mr Bradley could they give us some more evidence about electronic
surveillance as an evidentiary tool in a positive way, and do they think that
just following the paper trail without these extra powers is going to be enough?
Graham Blewitt
First of all just taking up your point as to the effectiveness of electronic
surveillance, and I will talk in a moment about the National Crime Authority’s
Operation Silo You also mentioned Operation Lavender. I would like to point
out that that was an operation conducted by the Australian Federal Police and
not the Authority
In relation to electronic surveillance it is the Authority’s experience that
it is certainly a very valuable tool. There is a huge gap between the incidence
of matters that have to be investigated and the resources that the Authority has
to investigate those matters. The Authority aims to be eﬂicient in its
investigations and one way of doing that of course is uSing the tools that will
get to the evidence quicker.
I think you have to bear in mind that the criminal element is becoming
more and more sophisticated. They are aware of the traditional police methods,
and they can bring about ways of getting around them so that they cannot be
detected. The more they do it the better they get at it. Now unless the police
' have the powers to combat that I am afraid there will never ever be a real
impact on the criminal elements.
Operation Silo involved the investigation of the criminal activities of
Bruce Cornwell and his partner Barry Bull. Those two people or, at least,
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Cornwell, was a target of various police forces including the Joint Drug Task
Force for a number of years and Cornwell was able to elude detection because
of the methods that he had adopted. The Authority was fortunate enough to
put in a listening device in a property or house that he was using as a safe house.
As a result of that action information was gained that not only was he planning
an importation of some four tonnes of cannabis within the following months
but that he had been talking about an importation which had occurred some
months earlier involving two tonnes of cannabis. That cargo was actually landed
in Australia and was undetected. The authorities had no idea that that cargo
had arrived. Had it not been for the listening device the Authority would not
have been aware of that offence and would not have commenced a course of
investigation which ultimately led to the prosecution of not only Cornwell and
Bull for that matter but a number of others. They are all currently in custody
serving lengthy sentences.
I think the point to be made there is that electronic surveillance is an
important tool and without it it is quite possible that the Authority may not
have been able to detect any crimanal activity by Cornwell and Bull and they
could still be out there today.
As far as the paper trail is concerned, one of the basic problems with
all the legislation which deals with the forfeiture of assets and the proceeds of
crime is that it is conviction based. There is one exception in that proceedings
taken under the pecuniary penalty proceedings under the Customs Act is not
conviction based. But in relation to all the other legislation there is little point
in following a paper trail if there is not going to be a conviction at the end of
it because the reality will be that there will be nothing to seize because there
has been no conviction upon which the court can either impose a penalty or
order forfeiture of tainted property. Unless the police are able to identify and
prosecute for offences and bring about a conviction the paper trail is not going
to lead anywhere except if you give the information to the Taxation Department
and that Department might be able to take some other action.
Chairman
I may be able to add one very small piece of personal experience to what
has been said about the number of warrants that has been issued. The fact that
no warrant may have been refused in this State could well be due to the
requirement that applications need to come before a Supreme Court judge. This
tends strongly towards ensuring that it is only in proper cases that applications
are made. I myself do not normally issue these warrants. They are normally
dealt with by judges from elsewhere in the court. But very occasionally I do. I
can only remember one particular instance and it was an overwhelming case
for the grant of a warrant. I have no recollection of what actually happened to
it. No doubt it was reported back in due course, but it has passed from my
memory so I cannot identify the instance. Another instance that came recently
to my notice was in the hearing of the appeal of the Anita Cobby murderers.
A listening device was used by the police in the investigatory stages. It
ultimately was of some significance in establishing the case of guilt of one of
those murderers. I had no part in issuing the warrant and did not see the
information which was the actual product of the use of that listening device. I
am well aware, however, that its utility certainly justiﬁed the issue of the
warrant. That is merely a small piece of personal experience that I can add into
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the mix in evaluating whether there is any abuse of this system. I have not
myself heard of a complaint that the system is being abused in New South Wales
other than general expressions of concern from those whose views are on the
libertarian side of the pendulum swing. As regards speciﬁc instancesl can only
say that I do not know of any.
Beverley Schurr
Yes. I wanted to add a comment. The previous speaker is refering to
the last three pages of my paper. There is some analysis there of what sort of
offences justify warrants in Canada and the United States and it is quite rare
that warrants are obtained in relation to murders. From 1969 to 1973 in the
US. there were no phone tap warrants issued in relation to murder, kidnapping
or assault.
Often it arises that situations involving murder and people’s lives being
in jeopardy are invoked as the great justiﬁcation for phone taps and listening
devices. In fact, they are routinely used for less serious offences and they are
often not a good investigation device for murder and other matters.
Phillip Bradley
The suggestion that electronic surveillance is not a good investigative
device or not a good evidentiary tool is, with respect, ridiculous. There are a
number of very signiﬁcant cases indeed which would not have resulted in
conviction but for electronic surveillance evidence. They are mostly drug
trafﬁcking cases, but if you are arguing against the extension of the telephone
interception powers to other offences you should look at the experiences to
which the Chief Justice has just referred and also to the Royal Commission
Report on the Age Tapes which demonstrates that in the non-narcotics area
electronic surveillance is a devastating investigative tool. To suggest that it is
not is ridiculous and to suggest that it is not productive of useful evidence is
also ridiculous. To suggest that the level of usage of the telephone by criminals
will fall away once the extent of electronic surveillance becomes known is only
partially true. There are documented cases where criminals have used the
telephone knowing that their telephone is being intercepted and have provided
useful information to investigators and there are plenty of people in this room
who will support that proposition.
The paper trail is only one aspect of investigation, it is no substitute for
electronic surveillance. The evidence which ultimately convicts these people
comes from a number of sources. Electronic surveillance is only one and it is
more suitable to some sorts of cases than others. The paper trail is just another
method and is more suitable to some sorts of cases than others. I am talking
about criminal evidence. (I am not talking about the recovery of proceeds of
crime). But there are a number of obstacles in the way of the investigator along
the paper trail. Costigan did not have as big a problem as other people had. To
get a search warrant to obtain the documents is sometimes difﬁcult. Police
cannot get information which is protected by the secrecy provisions such as
s. 16 of the Income Tax Assessment Act and a number of other pieces of
legislation. Costigan could. You cannot go behind the Hong Kong law, for
example, which protects nominee owners of companies from disclosing
beneﬁcial owners. With the deregulation of foreign exchange it is very easy to
gain that protection and become an anonymous lender from Hong Kong. You
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can in fact lend money to yourself without the Tax Department knowing or
being able to investigate it. The paper trail is a very difficult trail to follow.
Now it is being followed. It is hard work and I do not think that people are
discouraged by the fact that it is hard work. In some cases electronic surveillance
is easier but they are not substitutesfor each other. They are different areas of
investigation. They provide different sorts of evidence and they apply to a
different degree to different types of cases.
Keith Mason, Q. C., Solicitor General
I would like to provide some information about the operation of the
Listening Devices Act in New South Wales. Notice has to be given of any
application for a warrant for the issue of a listening device to the Attorney
General. By delegation the Solicitor-General has been appointed up until now,
and he may well continue to be the person that personally peruses the terms of
that notiﬁcation. From my observation approximately one-third of warrants that
are sought satisfy an indirect dual function in that the listening device is a
device that is attached to an informer or a police ofﬁcer who is to go to a pre-
arranged meeting with some person suspected of a criminal offence where the
presence of the listening device and the capacity of others to listen from a place
of proximity is capable of providing a protective function to the person
involved. And secondly, in relation to the comment made about a warrant never
having been refused. The purpose of serving notice on the Attorney General is
to enable the Attorney General to appear on the hearing of the application for
the warrant. I know of one situation which involved my predecessor where the
terms under which the warrant was proposed to be sought, it being a warrant
for a listening device to be used in a particular context in a prison, and the
notice in this particular case had been given. The circumstances in which the
listening device was intended to be used was seen to be inappropriately wide
and by a process of negotiation they were modiﬁed and because of that there
was no necessity for any intervention in opposition to that application.
Phillip Boulton, Solicitor for Director, Legal Aid Commission of N.S.W.
I would like to take this opportunity to have a few of my fears allayed
by representatives from the National Crime Authority and from the D.P.P., a
few fears that I have as a defence lawyer who is privy to quite a few pieces of
juicy information. I might be seen as a fairly prime target for bugging or for
electronic surveillance of one sort or another. Every day in my office or on my
telephone I get all sorts of information that the National Crime Authority or
the D.P.P. or other prosection authorities might be interested in. These are
usually in quite a privileged situation. How likely is it that my phone is bugged
or my oﬂice is bugged, and how well founded were the rumors that swept the
Darlinghurst Courts last year that the legal boxes at Long Bay Gaol had been
bugged pursuant to a warrant issued by a Supreme Court judge? How often is
that going to happen, if it happened at all? How many solicitors’ ofﬁces are
bugged in New South Wales, and how often is it that bugs placed in gaols in
legal boxes to record conversations between prisoners and their legal
representatives? Maybe it did not happen, maybe it does not happen, maybe it
will never happen to me. Let us hope so.
I would like to make one comment, Mr Blewitt’s reference throughout
these proceedings to the Cornwell and Bull case has not been completely
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accurate. He referred on several occasions both in the paper and in his
submissions that all these matters are completed and that everything is out of
the way and we can talk freely about the matters. I am currently representing
someone who was arrested out of those inquires and who has been committed
for trial and who has yet to stand trial. I ﬁnd it somewhat amusing to say the
least that the National Crime Authority does not know about the prosecution
that they have in hand. At least their representative did not know about it. Is
' that the sort of surveillance of their ﬁles that falls over into the surveillance of
telephone tapping and bugging?
Graham Blewitt
In responseto some of the fears that Mr Boulton has raised I am afraid
I cannot comment. I am precluded from speaking about operational matters by
virtue of section 51 of the National Crime Authority Act so I am not in a
position to say whether or not there were any bugs at any particular place on
any particular occasion, perhaps Mr Bradley might be able to offer some
comments there if he wishes. In relation to your last comment, Mr Boulton,
whilst it is quite true that there is still at least one accused yet to be dealt with
in relation to that offence the Authority has gone public in relation to its
Operation Silo but the defendant or accused that you mentioned has not been
named and his name was not included in the Report which was presented to
Government last year. '
Phillip Bradley
I do not know whether the cubicles at Long Bay are or were bugged. As
to solicitor’s ofﬁces, solicitors are not immune from electronic surveillance. As
we all know solicitors have been convicted of criminal offences, some Of them
quite serious ones. The position is, as with search warrants, that it is possible
for warrants to be obtained to bug solicitors’ ofﬁces and search warrants have
certainly been executed on a number of solicitors’ ofﬁces, in some cases the
solicitors were involved in criminal offences, in other cases the warrant was to
obtain information from the solicitor’s office in relation to the criminal offences
of others. There are now speciﬁc arrangements with the Law Council of
Australia dealing with the protection of legal professional privilege in those
situations.
You mentioned the standard of surveillance and the controls that were
placed on the surveillance operatives. In the federal context there are a number
of ﬁlters which apply. Firstly, applications are made by ofﬁcers at or above the
rank of Inspector, they have to get the approval of the Regional Commander,
and he actually reads the affidavit in- support of the warrant. They then have
to get the approval of a special committee established in Canberra, they then
have to get the approval of the D.P.P., they then have to get the approval of a
Federal Court judge and the Federal Court judges, I can tell you, do not rubber
stamp. They interrogate the officer and the solicitor who appears on the
Chamber application. There are a lot of ﬁlters and it is not at all a simple
process by which all you have to do is knock together an affidavit and you are
assured of a warrant. A lot of them are knocked back at various stages through
the ﬁltering process and if somebody was bold enough to suggest to a Federal
Court judge that they ought to get a warrant on a solicitor’s ofﬁce simply
because he acted for criminals there would be absolutely no prospect at all of
getting a warrant.
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Beverley Schurr
There were submissions made to the Federal Government that they
should include in the 1987 amendments a form of protection for legal
professional privilege. It would have been open to the government to adopt the
wording in the Canadian legislation which protects the privilege without
impending the investigation of any lawyer suspected of committing an offence,
but they declined to do that and that is a matter of continuing concern for the
Council for Civil Liberties and the Law Society and other organisations.
Phillip Bradley
Could I just also mention that in the context of the ﬁltering process that
the monitors who actually listen to the telephone conversations and take down
the information are monitors isOlated from the investigation to a large extent.
The information that is provided to the investigators is that which is determined
by the ofﬁcer-in-charge of the‘shift in the monitoring place, to be relevant to
the investigation. The great bulk of the information that passes over the
telephones is regarded by the monitors and the ofﬁcer-in-charge as irrelevant
and does not get to the investigators. It is a great source of irritation to
investigators that somebody removed from the investigation has the power to
decide what is and what is not relevant especially in circumstances where people
talk in code and foreign languages and things like that.
Duncan Chappe/l, Director, Australian Institute of Criminology
l have been listening with interest to the comments that have been made
about the effectiveness of this tool that we are talking about, that of electronic
surveillance. We have also heard and read in the papers of the enormous success
with the investigation of Operation Silo. We have heard about the ﬁltering
process just a moment ago but we have not heard about the failures. That
troubles me because I am sure there have been failures in these investigations
as well as refusals up through that system. Yet the information about that is
still a matter of conﬁdence amongst the agencies who are using these devices.
We are unable in general it seems to penetrate that veil because the usual
response is that “This is an operational matter” or “I can’t divulge this” or
whatever. I just wondered if we can hear from the people who have this
privileged information about some failures as well as some successes.
Also I would like to hear more about the cost of these matters and the
way in which these costs are weighed up or not weighed up in deciding whether
to use some of these techniques. These are incredibly resource intensive
techniques as I understand. In fact, you have just mentioned that people actually
have to listen to these conversations which can be excruciatingly boring. I
should imagine it is a form of “cruel and unusual punishment” to be one of
these monitors. Apart from that someone has to go and make an assessment
whether they are relevant or not. You have not only got the monitoring process
but I suspect you have also got an interpretation process. Some of the bad guys
are not immune from talking in a language which I suspect you have very great
difﬁculty ﬁnding interpreters for. That adds again' to the expenses and costs and
you probably wind up with enormous amounts of information which either you
can never use or it takes an enormous amount of time to ﬁnd out what is
happening. -
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This leads me to another comment which relates to the reliance that we
do tend to place throughout this process on judicial scrutiny. I have enormous
admiration for the ability of judicial ofﬁcers to be able to identify the
appropriateness of these warrants and to decide whether they should be
approved. Yet still we see, and I speak most recently from Canadian experience,
that in 1985 something like 600 out of 600 warrants were approved. Now that
shows that perhaps those involved are legally perfect and very convincing in
the arguments that they make. But I really do ﬁnd that a fairly unrealistic
statistic. I would be interested to know whether there would be any reaction
from the panel to ﬁgures like these. Perhaps what judicial ofﬁcers need, in
addition to their own scrutiny of these materials is the assistance of some expert
independent assessor who might be retained who knows the sorts of intricacies
of these types of investigation and who also was involved in questioning
rigourously the ofﬁcers who come forward with the warrant. Then there also ‘
should be a rigourous post hoc assessment of the warrants that were approved,
not merely by a return that comes from the ofﬁcers themselves as to how these
matters were dealt with but also by some independent source. Perhaps the
Ombudsman is one of those peOple but being a researcher I would like to see
someone who got into those 600 Canadian case warrants that were issued,
followed them through, found out what the results were and presented a report.
Maybe it would be a conﬁdential report but at least it would be an attempt at
evaluating the outcome of these types of investigations. In the United States
something like that is done through the services of the General Accounting
Ofﬁce. I also notice that some of the papers mentioned the Oﬂice of Technology
Assessment. We just do not have that type to agency, so far as I am aware, that
would be able to do these assessments but I am sure that we could come up
with some group that might be able to look at these warrants. I would like to
hear what the failures have been, I would also like to hear about the assessor
idea.
Phillip Bradley
Firstly knockbacks and failures. There are a number of knockbacks in
the course of the ﬁltering process, I cannot tell you how many there are or what
the proportion is but I acknowledge that there is probably scope for some ‘sort
of bald statisitics which would not reveal operational matters. Failures, there
are certainly failures. People from my ofﬁce have appeared in chambers on a
number of matters in respect of which a brief has not subsequently been
delivered for a narcotics prosecution and we assume that they were failures in
the sense that no evidence was obtained. I suppose that there is plenty of scope
for ﬁgures to be produced on those as well.
On costs. It is very expensive. There is an intricate system established
by Telecom, there is a special ofﬁce established to receive the information, it
is expensive equipment,‘it is round the clock, it requires sometimes immediate
responses and therefore you have to have people who can communicate with
the investigators in urgent cases. But it should not be distinguished on that basis
because all surveillance is expensive. If you are going to surveill a person’s
house, or particular premises where you think a particular crime is going to be
committed you are going to have to have some sort of an observation post, or
a listening post in the case of electronic surveillance which has to be manned
around,the clock. Somebody has to be actually looking out of the window and
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in the case of say a Kombi van or something like that you have to have more
than one person in the vehicle. They are going to have to do all of their usual
acts within the vehicle as they cannot leave for long periods. It is extremely
expensive. The overtime bills are enormous. The equipment bills are high. You
have to use hire cars you can’t use police vehicles. You cannot distinguish
electronic surveillance on the basis of manpower costs. Certainly there are very
high equipment costs but there are very signiﬁcant savings in the area of
surveillance too. In some cases avenues which might have led to investigation
from visual observation are not pursued because electronic surveillance is
involved. I will give you an example. A man leaves his premises to go to the
shop to buy a packet of cigarettes. You do not need to call in a mobile unit to
follow him if through the use of the listening device you have found out that
he is just going to buy a packet of cigarettes. Of course, he could be misleading
you but you can usually eliminate some resources in that sort of situation.
As to judicial scrutiny I agree with the ﬁgures that in the order of 100
per cent of warrents get approved. They do not get approved, by the way,
without conditions being imposed by the judicial ofﬁcers. The statistics, I think,
are a reﬂection of the ﬁltering process. An Insector who applies, a Regional
‘Commander who approves, a Special Committee of high ranking ofﬁcers in
Canberra who approves and a principal legal ofﬁcer from the Director of Public
Prosecutions Ofﬁce approves before it gets to the judge. As to contemporaneous
monitoring there is probably scope for that but it is just going to be somebody
looking over the shoulder of a judge I would have thought. In the New South
Wales context there is provision for the Solicitor-General to be notiﬁed and
appear if he wishes, and that is a variety of the other side of public interest
input. In the Commonwealth context there is now provision for supervision by
the Ombudsman, both the Commonwealth Ombudsman and (in the mirror New
South Wales legislation) the New South Wales Ombudsman.
Chairman
Did you want to comment on Dr Chappell’s suggestion of an
independent participant in the application before the judge, the Devil’s
Advocate if yOu like, although that is not quite the right context for it, and the
other matter that Dr Chappell raised was the practicability of having some ex
post facto published analysis or at least conﬁdentially published analysis of the
results of the system?
Phillip Bradley
Dealing with the last point ﬁrst. In the interceptions environment the
ex post facto investigation and reporting is dealt with to some extent by the
New South Wales and Commonwealth Ombudsman being involved.
As to having an advocate on behalf of the public interest in preserving
the privacy of individuals present during the Chamber application that is
available through the Solicitor-General in the State context. At the moment it
is hard to think of somebody else who anyone would be prepared to have there.
I suppose there is somebody, like another judge for example, or perhaps a senior
member of the Bar or the legal profession, who would be called out'once every
second day to sit in Chambers with the judge and put the view in favour of the
protection of privacy. Personally I do not think it would work and I do not
think it is necessary either but I speak from the position of a Prosecutor.
;
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D. B. Amarti, Magistrate
I do not wish to give my name because it might breach my privacy. I
would be concerned not to tell which of the four people I am going to ask the
question of because that would be a breach of theirs, and I do not think I should
say what the question is because it might breach other people’s privacy. But
having said that my name is Amarti. I am a magistrate.
I ask—Is there not privacy paranoia? It seems to me that there is a,
degree of concern amongst the innocent citizens in the community that they
are going to be swept up in the net. That they are going to become the fruits
of the illegal interceptions to the extent that they are going to be prosecuted for
all manner of minor crimes. That for every 84 warrants some 4 200 people are
going to be overheard. The simple fact is that there are not the resources, I
would not have thought, in the prosecution authorities, or the investigative
authorities to be concerned about 4 200 odd people when they are probably
concerned with 1 of those 4 200 and not the other 4 199. If on the other hand
innocent people conduct innocent conversations with a person who happens to
be a criminal then nothing will come of it, but if people in the course of
transacting crimes conduct conversations with that guilty person then why
shouldn’t they be caught up in the net? To take forward the submission of the
Chairperson of National Organisation to Reform Marijuana Laws, if all these
minor dealers happen to discuss it with this major dealer—why shouldn’t they
be caught up in the net? But it seems to me that the innocent are adequately
protected. Without being anecdotal, I recently concluded a case which went for
some 8 weeks. In nearly all of those 8 weeks I sat listening to tapes. I was lucky
that the Federal police ofﬁcers and one, in particular, who transcribed those
tapes, had spent 700 hours transcribing them. They were a minor part of a 12-
month operation. I received a very minor percentage of the tapes. In the course
of those conversations naturally log books were kept, naturally names were
written down, but the effect of it was that they were only interested, or I
believed they were only interested, in those who were directly involved in this
particular conspiracy. But all the other names are quickly'lost. The individual
ofﬁcer who has the unpleasant task of listening for many hours on end is not
remotely interested in the innocent people, nor are there the resources
subsequently to come back and pick them up in the net. I would have thought
the innocent were adequately protected.
Gerry Hay, Prison Superintendent, Department of Corrective Services,
I was interested in Mr Boulton’s comments. I have not ever had any
evidence of bugs in legal boxes in gaols but I fully support the fact that there
should be a lot more of them. Much of the information that we get from out
clients has led to the solving of certain crimes and the prevention of future
offences that have been arranged from within the institutions. Butthe thing that
concerns me, and I would like to ask the most relevant member of your panel
to give me an answer, is that in some of our institutions we do have telephone
tapping devices, we have monitoring devices, and all prisoners are informed
that their telephone calls in and out will be monitored and may be recorded,
and they are well aware of that. However, new staff coming to the gaols and
making illicit phone calls on the same phones are not always aware of that and
we have, on one or two occasions, been able to track down staff who were
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involved in offences and who have since been convicted and dismissed. They
have done this without the knowledge. that they were being recorded or
monitored and I am just wondering where that puts us in relation to the bugging
laws that are in vogue today.
Phillip Bradley
The Telecommunications Act as opposed to the Telecommunications
Interception Act prevents you from attaching devices to telephones that are not
authorised by Telecom. I assume that in your case they are authorised
attachments. There is also an exception within the Interceptions Act to permit
interception where the device is installed by Telecom. The usual sorts of things
are telephones where you get a blip to indicate that the interception is occurring,
and thereby you are deemed to consent because you have heard the blip and
you know that the recording is going on. If there is no blip on the phone and
if it is not an interception that is authorised then you might be in a bit of
trouble.
Chairman
I do not think the Institute of Criminology can give legal advice and I
think we should disclaim any responsibility for any legal views that might be
expressed.
John Demirian. Security Consultant
Under the Freedom ofInformation Act will it be possible to request and
receive conﬁrmation from the parties, being law enforcement agencies, on
interceptions which have been or are being conducted, Commonwealth as well
as State?
Chairman
I think it is difﬁcult for us to answer what is the effect of a current statute
or what may be in a statute that is pending. I think our role rather is to discuss
the criminological signiﬁcance of it. It may be that you would suggest that it is
desirable that there be such a provision and provide comments on the
desirability.
John Demirian
Is there any section in the new legislation in relation to this?
Beverley Schurr
I know that the New South Wales Listening Devices Act like the North
American Acts does require that a person whose phone has been tapped or
whose conversations have been tapped must be notiﬁed after the interception
has ceased unless there are serious reasons why not. That is a requirement in
Canada and the US. and it is in the Listening Devices Act but I cannot recall
whether it is in the federal amendments. I do not think it is in the Amendments
to the Australian Act so it is another example of how we do not have as much
access to information as do our North American counterparts.
 m”-
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Michael Wilcock, Attorney General’s Department, Commonwealth
The amendments to the Telecommunications Interception Act set out
speciﬁcally how intercept information can be used, communicated, or records
. made of it, and speciﬁcally there will be now provision for F.O.I. access to
intercept information in any form including the people who might have been
| the subject of the intercepts, unless they happen to be involved in a prosecution
_ in which case they would get access to it in the normal course of intercept
! information being made available to the defence.
Mr Blewitt started by saying he thought that there were no doubts that
in certain circumstances electronic surveillance should be used for law
enforcement purposes, and we ﬁnished with Dr Morgan from the Privacy
Committee saying that it was her view that the Privacy Committee would not
condone in any circumstances the use of electronic surveillance, or that is the
way that I understood it. Those totally diametric views no doubt reﬂect the
spectrum of the views of the communityat large about this sort of question
because it does involve competing balances between privacy and law
enforcement. I would agree however with some of the other speakers that in
regard to Telecommunications Interception legislation, the legislative safeguards
for' the privacy of people, or the informal institutional resource and other sorts
of safeguards that operate to effectively limit the types of operations that law
enforcement agencies might wish to undertake are very real protections. They
are the sorts of protections which may not necessarily be suitable for legislation
but the trouble with this area, as with many other areas, is that if you choose
to delineate every safeguard, that you may in an ideal world want to have, you
will end up with such a complicated piece of over-regulated legislation that none
will be able to move without bumping into another section of the Act. I think
already that the current Amendment Act which has not come into operation
would be considered by many law enforcement agencies, possibly by the
Ombudsman and certain other professional participants in the ﬁeld, as being
excessive in the sorts of provisions that are imposed upon them. However, I
think all of those participants recognise that those provisions are required by
the community at large to give them some sort of assurance that intercept
operations are being conducted in a way which is accountable, in the ﬁnal
analysis, to the Attorney General and the Parliament of this country.
Peter Hidden, Senior Public Defender
I feel some response is called for to the remarks of Mr Amarti,
particularly in the light of the response which they spontaneously received. I
know it is stating the obvious but Mr Amarti seemed to be suggesting that if
in the course of electronic surveillance investigators become privy to innocent
communications then no harm is done to those innocent people. That is simply
not so. The harm thatis done is that investigating ofﬁcers become privy to
communications which are none of their business and which those innocent
people were entitled to think were private. Let us not forget that that is the
major social problem with legislation of this kind. I am not saying that there
should never be electronic surveillance. Of course, there are circumstances where
there must be, but let us not lose sight of the fact that those who express anxiety
and want stringent safeguards are not simply setting out to protect minor
criminals to be exposed by electronic surveillance, they are setting out to protect
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the innocent whose private communications are entitled to their privacy.
Brent Fisse, Professor of Law, Director of Institute of Criminolgy
I would like to follow on from the last comment in response to the
position taken by Mr Amarti earlier. It seems to me that the logic of Mr
Amarti’s position, that the innocent have nothing to fear from the use of
electronic surveillance entails that we should have general search warrants in
the context of the searches for documentary evidence and other conventional
forms of evidence. the way the law of the Commonwealth and of New South
Wales stands at the present time we do not have general search warrants in
relation to documentary evidence and other conventional forms of evidence.
Under the Search Warrants Act 1985 (N.S.W.) search warrants must be well-
focussed. They must be speciﬁc. General search warrants are not authorised.
Similarly under the Crimes Act (Cth), s. 10, search warrants must be speciﬁc;
they must achieve particularity of search. This raises quite a fundamental issue
in relation to the protection of privacy by search warrant procedures in our
country. What we see at the present time is the authorisation of general search
warrants for interception of telephones or surveillance by means of listening
devices. By radical contrast, in the setting of conventional searches for
documentary evidence and other standard forms of evidence, general search
warrants are not authorised: there must be speciﬁc search warrants. The law
here is rather schizophrenic in its approach. I wonder what is needed to achieve
a consistent approach. There seem to be two main options. First, we might do
away with electronic surveillance where speciﬁcity of search cannot be achieved.
In other words, unless it is possible to focus on particular conversations so as
to achieve a focussed search, arguably we should not allow general warrants for
electronic surveillance.
A second option that stands out, it seems to me, is to introduce general
search warrants in relation to documentary and other conventional forms of
evidence. And, to conclude, if general search warrants were available, would
there really be much need for electronic surveillance?
David Brown, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law University of New South
Wales
I would just like to make a couple of points that Mr Blewitt from the
National Crime Authority raised in response to questions. Firstly he said that
there was no point in following the paper trail unless a conviction was going to
result so that some property or assets could be forfeited. I think that that
continues the ‘scoreboard’ view that success in combating organised crime
should be evaluated by reference to the number of convictions and that was a
view that was a very strongly criticised by the Parliamentary Committee on the
N.C.A. in one of its Reports. There are other alternative measures of success
such as the success in'removing some of the conditions that actually sustain
organised crime, such as policy recommendations in the area of policing, and
particularly the accountability of particular specialists squads, banking
arrangements, foreign exchange transactions, legal changes directed at altering
market mechanisms in relation to illegal drugs and so on, The point is that given
there is already a substantial market in illegal drugs, policies which merely
measure success by targeting the number of convictions against people who are
supplying that market really do not address the underlying conditions under
which that market is going to be sustained.
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The second point, he referred on a couple of occasions to, or at least
made an assumption about, a complete split between what he called the
“criminal element” on the one hand and the policing organizations on the other.
I think if we have learned anything from the recent enquiries in a number of
States in Australia it is that that distinction perhaps is not quite so clear. That
at least on a number of occasions what he calls the criminal elements and the
police if not actually one and the same have at least been very closely
intertwined. Even if we look at the Stewart Report and the so-called “honest
police” that we have heard a lot about, we ﬁnd that in the Criminal Intelligence
Unit in New South Wales they were engaged in an 16 year long illegal taping
operation which culminated in. the destruction of evidence, the lying to Special
Prosecutors, and indeed the holding of meetings attended by a large number of
police ofﬁcers, at which one of the things agreed was that that meeting never
took place. So my point here is that simplistic assumptions which divide the
world into the good and honest on the one hand, and the wicked and evil on
the other are a rather inadequate basis for the complex task of investigating the
conditions that sustain organised crime.
Chairman
The note on which the last two speakers have left us is indeed an.
appropriate one as Professor Fisse has pointed out the anomalies in the whole,
of this area of the law and Mr Brown has raised the social issue. Ultimately we
come back to the broad question of what price in point of inroads on personal
freedom are we in this society prepared to pay as things stand today in the
pursuit of the criminal elements of our society. In a crime free society no doubt
we would not be prepared to stand any inroad. If we were riddled with crime
then we might be prepared to accept a major inroad. When the country was at
war we had substantial inroads on personal freedom in the form of identiﬁcation
cards and all sorts of personal surveillance. It is a pendulum and there is no
ultimate absolute place where it is right for that pendulum to rest because it
moves dynamically with the rise and fall of trends in society. I am‘sure that we
are all going to leave this seminar with a fuller understanding of the whole
question.
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